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The Currency of Life
Alan B. Krueger, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, 
Norbert Schwarz, and Arthur A. Stone
Time is the coin of your life. It is the only coin you have, and 
only you can determine how it will be spent. Be careful lest you 
let other people spend it for you.
—Carl Sandburg
1.1    Introduction
The development of the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) 
was arguably the foremost contribution of economics in the last century, 
and the National Bureau of Economic Research’s role in developing the 
accounts remains an unparalleled achievement. Nearly every country tracks 
its national income today, and limiting ﬂ  uctuations in national income is a 
goal of public policy around the world. The National Accounts have been 
used to estimate bottlenecks in the economy, to forecast business growth, 
and to inform government budgeting.1 As then-  Treasury Secretary Robert 
Rubin said, “the development of the GDP measure by the Department of 
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1. In one important early application, Fogel (2001, 213) describes how Simon Kuznets and 
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Commerce is a powerful reminder of the important things that government 
can and does do to make the private economy stronger and our individual 
lives better.”2
Yet gross domestic product (GDP), national income, consumption, and 
other components of the National Accounts have long been viewed as par-
tial measures of society’s well-  being—by economists and noneconomists 
alike. For one thing, the National Accounts miss “near-  market” activities, 
such as home production (e.g., unpaid cleaning, cooking, and child care), 
which produce services that could be purchased on the market. Perhaps 
more signiﬁ  cantly, the National Accounts do not value social activities, such 
as interactions between friends or husbands and wives, which have an impor-
tant eﬀect on subjective well-  being. Because economic activity is measured 
by prices, which are marginal valuations in perfectly competitive markets, 
the National Accounts miss consumer surplus from market transactions. 
Diamonds are counted as more valuable than water, for example, yet one 
could question whether diamonds contribute more to society’s well-  being. 
Other limitations of the National Accounts that have long been recognized 
are: externalities improperly accounted for; prices distorted in imperfectly 
competitive markets; and the particular distribution of income in a country 
inﬂ  uences prices and marginal valuations. While attempts have been made 
to adjust the National Accounts for some of these limitations—such as by 
valuing some forms of nonmarket activity—these eﬀorts are unlikely to go 
very far in overcoming these problems.
Many of these sentiments were alluded to by Robert Kennedy in his speech 
“On Gross National Product” at the University of Kansas on March 18, 
1968:
Too much and for too long, we seemed to have surrendered personal 
excellence and community values in the mere accumulation of material 
things. Our Gross National Product . . . if we judge the United States 
of America by that . . . counts air pollution and cigarette advertising, 
and ambulances to clear our highways of carnage. It counts special locks 
for our doors and the jails for the people who break them. It counts the 
destruction of the redwood and the loss of our natural wonder in chaotic 
sprawl. . . . And the television programs which glorify violence in order to 
sell toys to our children. Yet the Gross National Product does not allow 
for the health of our children, the quality of their education or the joy 
of their play. It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength 
of our marriages, the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of 
our public oﬃcials. It measures neither our wit nor our courage, neither 
our wisdom nor our learning, neither our compassion nor our devotion 
which it would come and to identify the materials that were binding constraints on expansion” 
prior to the U.S. entry in World War II.
2. Quoted from “GDP: One of the Great Inventions of the 20th Century,” Survey of Current 
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3. Transcription available from: www.jfklibrary.org/  HistoricalResources/ Archives/ 
ReferenceDesk/ Speeches/ RFK/ RFKSpeech68Mar18UKansas.htm.
4. Kennedy’s point has resonance with at least one politician. In an interview, Barack Obama 
told David Leonhardt (2008) the following: “One of my favorite quotes is—you know that 
famous Robert F. Kennedy quote about the measure of our G.D.P.? . . . it’s one of the most 
beautiful of his speeches.”
5. For surveys of economics research using the more conventional measures of life satisfac-
tion, see Frey and Stutzer (2002) and Layard (2005).
to our country, it measures everything in short, except that which makes 
life worthwhile.3
The problem is not so much with the National Accounts themselves as 
with the fact that policymakers and the public often lose sight of their limi-
tations, or misinterpret national income as the sole object of policy and 
primary measure of well-  being.4
In this volume, we propose an alternative way of measuring society’s well-
  being, based on time use and aﬀective (emotional) experience. We call our 
approach National Time Accounting (NTA). National Time Accounting 
is a set of methods for measuring, categorizing, comparing, and analyzing 
the way people spend their time, across countries, over historical time, or 
between groups of people within a country at a given time.
Currently, time use is tracked according to the amount of time spent 
in various activities—such as traveling, watching television, and working 
for pay—but the evaluation and grouping of those activities is decided by 
external researchers and coders. Determining whether people are spending 
their time in more or less enjoyable ways than they were a generation ago is 
either impossible or subject to researchers’ judgments of what constitutes 
enjoyable leisure activities and arduous work. In addition to the obvious 
problem that researchers may not view time use in the same way as the 
general public, other problems with this approach are that: (a) many people 
derive some pleasure from nonleisure activities; (b) not all leisure activities 
are equally enjoyable to the average person; (c) the nature of some activities 
changes over time; (d) people have heterogeneous emotional experiences 
during the same activities; and (e) emotional responses during activities are 
not unidimensional. The methods we propose provide a means for evaluat-
ing diﬀerent uses of time based on the population’s own evaluations of their 
emotional experiences, what we call evaluated time use, which can be used to 
develop a system of national time accounts.
We view NTA as a complement to the National Income Accounts (NIA), 
not a substitute. Like the National Income Accounts, NTA is also incom-
plete, providing a partial measure of society’s well-  being. National time 
accounting misses people’s general sense of satisfaction or fulﬁ  llment with 
their lives as a whole, apart from moment to moment feelings.5 Still, we 
will argue that evaluated time use provides a valuable indicator of society’s 
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6. Because the earlier work focused on whether activities were enjoyable, it would not have 
been possible to construct our measure of time spent in an unpleasant state with their data. Our 
approach also diﬀers fundamentally from Glorieux (1993), who asked survey respondents to 
classify their time use into diﬀerent “meanings of time,” such as social time, time for personal 
gratiﬁ  cation, and meaningless time. Instead, we focus on the emotional experiences that occur 
over time.
analytical and policy advantages that are not available from other measures 
of subjective well-  being, such as overall life satisfaction.
There have been some attempts at NTA in the past, primarily by time- use 
researchers. Our approach builds on Juster’s (1985) seminal observation that 
“an important ingredient in the production and distribution of well-  being 
is the set of satisfactions generated by activities themselves” (333). To assess 
the satisfactions generated by activities, Juster asked respondents to rate on a 
scale from zero to ten how much they generally enjoy a given type of activity, 
such as their job or taking care of their children. Later research found that 
such general enjoyment ratings can deviate in important and theoretically 
meaningful ways from episodic ratings that pertain to speciﬁ  c instances of 
the activity (Schwarz, Kahneman, and Xu 2009). To overcome this prob-
lem, we utilize a time diary method more closely connected to the recalled 
emotional experiences of a day’s actual events and circumstances. Gershuny 
and Halpin (1996) and Robinson and Godbey (1997), who analyzed a single 
well- being measure (extent of enjoyment) and time use collected together in 
a time diary, are closer forerunners to our approach.
Our project is distinguished from past eﬀorts in that we approach NTA 
from more of a psychological well- being and Experience Sampling Method 
(ESM) perspective. For example, our measure of emotional experience is 
multidimensional, reﬂ  ecting diﬀerent core aﬀective dimensions. And like 
ESM, we try to measure the feelings that were experienced during diﬀerent 
uses of time as closely as possible. We also developed an easily interpretable 
and defensible metric of subjective well-  being, which combines the data on 
aﬀective experience and time use to measure the proportion of time spent 
in an unpleasant state.6 And we use cluster analysis to determine which 
groups of activities are associated with similar emotional experiences to 
facilitate the tracking of time use with historical and cross-  country data. 
Past research has not addressed how time-  use has shifted among activities 
associated with diﬀerent emotional experiences over time, or the extent to 
which cross-  country diﬀerences in time allocation can account for inter-
national diﬀerences in experienced well-  being. Lastly, our survey methods 
attempt to have respondents reinstantiate their day before answering aﬀect 
questions, to make their actual emotional experiences at the time more vivid 
and readily accessible for recall.
Past calls for National Time Accounting have largely foundered. It is 
instructive to ask why these eﬀorts were not more inﬂ  uential in academic 
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One possible explanation is that it is diﬃcult to collect time diary informa-
tion along with aﬀective experience in a representative population sample. 
To this end, we developed a telephone survey, called the Princeton Aﬀect and 
Time Survey (PATS), patterned on the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS’s) 
American Time Use Survey (ATUS), that is practical and easily adaptable 
for use in ongoing oﬃcial time-  use surveys. Another possible explanation 
is that evidence on the validity of subjective well-  being measures has pro-
gressed greatly in the last decade. While subjective data cannot be indepen-
dently veriﬁ  ed, a range of ﬁ  ndings presented in section 1.3 suggests that 
self-  reports of subjective experience indeed have signal. The earlier eﬀorts 
may have been ahead of their time and taken less seriously than they should 
have because such evidence was not yet available. Finally, it is diﬃcult to 
track down documentation on the precise methods used in past diary cum 
well-  being surveys. To facilitate replication and extensions, we have posted 
our main data sets, questionnaires, and background documents on the web 
at www.krueger.princeton.edu/  Subjective.htm.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 pro-
vides a conceptual framework for using evaluated time use in National Time 
Accounting and discusses perspectives on well- being in economics and psy-
chology. Section 1.3 provides evidence on the link between self-  reports of 
subjective well- being and objective outcomes, such as health and neurologi-
cal activity. Section 1.4 introduces the evaluated time-  use measures that we 
have developed and provides some evidence on their reliability and validity. 
Section 1.5 uses the PATS data to describe time use and aﬀective experience 
across groups of individuals and activities. Section 1.6 provides a method for 
grouping activities into categories based on the emotional experiences that 
they are associated with. To illustrate the utility of our techniques, section 
1.7 describes long-  term historical trends in the desirability of time use and 
section 1.8 provides a cross-  country comparison. Section 1.9 concludes by 
considering some knotty unresolved issues and by pointing to some oppor-
tunities for NTA in the future.
1.2    Conceptual  Issues
1.2.1      Economics of Time Use, Goods, and Utility
In a standard economic model, households receive utility from their 
consumption of leisure and goods. People choose to work because of the 
income and hence, consumption of goods that work makes possible. Avail-
able time and the wage rate are the constraints that people face. The national 
income and product accounts only value market output (or, equivalently, 
paid inputs and proﬁ  ts). Some attempts have been made to value nonmarket 
time using the wage rate as the shadow price of leisure. Becker (1965) argued 
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(e.g., meals), just like ﬁ  rms. Thus, in Becker’s model cooking only aﬀects util-
ity through the subsequent enjoyment of eating. Pollak and Wachter (1975) 
expand this framework to allow home production activities to aﬀect utility 
through their direct eﬀect on utility during the activities themselves and 
through the consumption of the output produced during the activities.
Dow and Juster (1985) and Juster, Courant, and Dow (1985) emphasize 
the notion of “process beneﬁ  ts,” or the ﬂ  ow of utility that accrues during 
particular activities, such as work and consumption.7 Juster, Courant, and 
Dow illustrate this idea in a Robinson Crusoe economy. Robinson can divide 
his time among three distinct activities: working in the market, cooking, and 
eating. He is constrained by the amount of food or clothing he can obtain 
through work, the amount of meals he can cook in a given period of time, 
and twenty-  four hours in a day.8 With the assumption that process beneﬁ  ts 
from activities are separable, utility can be written as:
(1)  U  V m(tw,xc)  V c(tc,xc,xf)  V e(te,xc,xm),
where V w, V c, and V e are the process beneﬁ  ts derived during work, cooking, 
and eating, respectively; xc is the quantity of clothing; xf is the quantity 
of food; xm is the amount of meals cooked; and t is the amount of time 
devoted to each activity. Juster, Courant, and Dow make the critical but 
sensible assumption “that the process beneﬁ  t obtained from each activity is 
independent of the time and goods devoted to other activities” (128). They 
defend this assumption by noting that “any stocks produced by activity i are 
permitted to aﬀect the process beneﬁ  ts from other activities.”9
The data that we collect are divided into episodes of varying length, not 
activities, so it is more natural to model the time devoted to episodes and 
the average process beneﬁ  t during those episodes. Consider someone who 
spends her ﬁ  rst t1 hours of the day working, her next t2 hours preparing 
meals, her next t3 hours eating the meals prepared earlier, and her ﬁ  nal t4 
hours working again. (Of course, this could easily be extended to allow for 
more episodes and other activities.) Under the assumption of separability, 
the utility function can be written as:













Taking means of the ﬂ  ow utilities over the relevant intervals gives:
7. They deﬁ  ne process beneﬁ  ts as the “direct subjective consequences from engaging in some 
activities to the exclusion of others. . . . For instance, how much an individual likes or dislikes 
the activity ‘painting one’s house,’ in conjunction with the amount of time one spends in paint-
ing the house, is an important determinant of well-  being independent of how satisﬁ  ed one 
feels about having a freshly painted house.” The idea of process beneﬁ  ts is closely related to 
Kahneman’s notion of “experienced utility.”
8. We ignore sleep to simplify the exposition.
9. An exception might be exercise. A period of exercising may raise someone’s mood during 
the rest of the day. We return to this following.National Time Accounting: The Currency of Life    1 5
(3)  Ui  t1v 1(t1,Xc)  t2v 2(t2,Xc,Xf)  t3v 3(t3,Xc,Xm)  t4v 4(t4,Xc).
It follows that a person’s total utility can be obtained from the duration 
weighted sum of average process beneﬁ  ts during the time the individual is 
engaged in each episode. There is no need to collect additional information 
on resources, constraints, or prices to summarize the person’s well-  being. 
Notice also that equation (3) does not require utility maximization. Even 
if the individual allocates his or her time suboptimally, if the mean process 
beneﬁ  t can be estimated it is possible to estimate his or her well-  being.
In this framework, which loosely guides our empirical work, the average 
well- being among N members of society, W, is W  Ui/  N. If one wants to 
put a dollar value on W, in principle it is possible to estimate the monetary 
price that people are willing to pay on the margin to increase their pro-
cess beneﬁ  t in some activity by one unit, and use the inverse of this ﬁ  gure 
as a numeraire. For example, the way workers trade oﬀ pay for a more or 
less pleasant job can give an estimate of the marginal willingness to pay to 
improve time spent in a pleasant state. Alternatively, the amount that people 
are willing to spend on various types of vacations can be related to the ﬂ  ow 
of utility they receive during those vacations to place a monetary value on 
additional utility. Although it is possible, under the assumption of rational 
decision making, to place a dollar value on W in this framework, we shy away 
from this step and focus instead on providing credible estimates of W.
Of course, measuring the ﬂ  ow of utility or emotions during various activi-
ties is no easy task, and some scholars doubt its feasibility entirely. Juster 
(1985) attempts to measure process beneﬁ  ts by using responses to the fol-
lowing question: “Now I’m going to read a list of certain activities that 
you may participate in. Think about a scale, from 10 to zero. If you enjoy 
doing an activity a great deal, rank it as a ‘10’; if you dislike doing it a great 
deal, rank it as a ‘0’; if you don’t care about it one way or the other, rank it 
in the middle as ‘5’. . . . Keep in mind that we’re interested in whether you 
like doing something, not whether you think it is important to do.” The 
activities included: cleaning the house, cooking, doing repairs, taking care 
of your child(ren), your job, grocery shopping, and so forth. For activity j, 
the enjoyment score is assumed to equal the process beneﬁ  t, Vj.
There are several important limitations to Juster’s type of enjoyment 
data, which we describe as a “general activity judgment” measure, because 
it focuses on a general response to a domain of life, not speciﬁ  c events that 
actually occurred. First, respondents are likely to develop a theory of how 
much they should enjoy an activity in order to construct an answer to the 
question. Second, respondents may be sensitive to the interviewers’ reactions 
to their answers. For example, someone may be concerned that they will 
be viewed as a bad parent or worker if they respond that they do not like 
taking care of their children or their job. Third, people are unlikely to cor-
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a particular activity in providing a general activity judgment. Other research 
(e.g., Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin 1997) has found that individuals ignore 
the duration of events and instead place excessive weight on the end and 
peak of the experience when answering general evaluative recall questions. 
Fourth, and related, individuals are likely to exercise selection bias in choos-
ing from the best or worst moments of past incidents of the speciﬁ  ed activi-
ties. Results presented below cast some doubt on the validity of general 
activity judgments. Fifth, it is unclear if individuals utilize the enjoyment 
scales in an interpersonally comparable way.
Nonetheless, as a description of time use and well- being, the process ben-
eﬁ  t approach has many advantages. Most importantly, the output of home 
production does not have to be observed or evaluated. A major goal of our 
work, therefore, has been to develop more informative measures of the ﬂ  ow 
of emotional experience during speciﬁ  c moments of the day.
1.2.2      The Psychology of Well-  Being
Contemporary psychology recognizes a variety of informative subjective 
well-  being (SWB) measures. Our view of the structure of subjective well-
  being concentrates on two qualitatively distinct constituents that both con-
tribute to SWB. The ﬁ  rst component pertains to how people experience their 
lives moment to moment as reﬂ  ected in the positive and negative feelings that 
accompany their daily activities. We refer to this component as “experienced 
happiness,” or the average of a dimension of subjective experience reported 
in real time over an extended period. The second component pertains to 
how people evaluate their lives. It is typically assessed with measures of 
life- satisfaction, like “Taking all things together, how satisﬁ  ed would you say 
you are with your life as a whole these days?” There are many ways in which 
these components of SWB can be measured, but we view them as reﬂ  ecting 
overlapping but distinct aspects of people’s lives.
Much of the variance of both experienced happiness and life satisfac-
tion is explained by variation in personal disposition that probably has a 
signiﬁ  cant genetic component (Diener and Lucas 1999; Lykken 1999). We 
focus here on two other determinants: the general circumstances of people’s 
lives (marital status, age, income) and the speciﬁ  cs of how they spend their 
time.
Evaluating one’s life as a whole poses a diﬃcult judgment task (see Schwarz 
and Strack 1999). Like other hard judgments, the evaluation of one’s life 
is accomplished by consulting heuristics—the answers to related questions 
that come more readily to mind (Kahneman 2003). Experimental demon-
strations of priming and context eﬀects provide evidence for the role of such 
heuristics in reports of life satisfaction (Schwarz and Strack 1999). Two 
heuristic questions that are used are: “How fortunate am I?” and “How good 
do I feel?” The ﬁ  rst involves a comparison of the individual’s circumstances 
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recent aﬀective experience. Research indicates, for example, that reported life 
satisfaction is higher on sunny than on rainy days, consistent with the inﬂ  u-
ence of the weather on their temporary moods. If individuals are ﬁ  rst asked 
explicitly about the weather, however, they become aware that their current 
feelings may only reﬂ  ect a temporary inﬂ  uence, which eliminates the eﬀect 
of weather on reported life satisfaction (Schwarz and Clore 1983).
In addition to personal eﬀects, aﬀective experience is determined by the 
immediate context and varies accordingly during the day; most people are 
happier sharing lunch with friends than driving alone in heavy traﬃc. Rus-
sell (1980) provides a theory of core aﬀect, in which emotions are described 
along two dimensions. One dimension ranges from pleasure to displeasure, 
and the other from highly activated to deactivated. Happiness, for example, 
is an activated, pleasurable state. We deﬁ  ne an individual’s experienced hap-
piness on a given day by the average value of this dimension of aﬀective 
experience for that day. Experienced happiness, so deﬁ  ned, is inﬂ  uenced by 
the individual’s allocation of time: a longer lunch and a shorter commute 
make for a better day. A person’s use of time, in turn, reﬂ  ects his or her 
circumstances and choices. Favorable life circumstances are more strongly 
correlated with activation than with experienced happiness.
A classic puzzle in SWB research involves the limited long-  term hedonic 
eﬀects of outcomes that are greatly desired or feared in anticipation and 
evoke intense emotions when they occur (Brickman, Coates, and Janoﬀ- 
Bulman 1978). In a recent study using longitudinal data, Oswald and Pow-
dthavee (2005) ﬁ  nd that average life satisfaction drops after the onset of 
a moderate disability but fully recovers to the predisability level after two 
years.10 This process is known as adaptation or habituation. Oswald and 
Powdthavee ﬁ  nd that adaptation takes place but is incomplete for severe 
disabilities. Life events such as marriage and bereavement have substantial 
short- run  eﬀects on happiness and life satisfaction, but these eﬀects are 
mainly temporary (e.g., Clark et al. 2003). Findings like these invite the idea 
of a potent process of hedonic adaptation that eventually returns people to 
a set point determined by their personality (see Diener, Lucas, and Scollon 
[2006]; Headey and Wearing [1989]).
Kahneman and Krueger (2006) conclude that adaptation to both income 
and to marital status is at least as complete for measures of experienced 
happiness as for life satisfaction. This conclusion is also consistent with 
Riis et al. (2005), who used experience sampling methods to assess the feel-
ings of end-  stage renal dialysis patients and a matched comparison group. 
They found no signiﬁ  cant diﬀerences in average mood throughout the day 
between the dialysis patients and the controls.
10. Smith et al. (2005) ﬁ  nd that the onset of a new disability causes a greater drop in life 
satisfaction for those in the bottom half of the wealth distribution than for those in the top 
half, suggesting an important buﬀering eﬀect of wealth, although low-  wealth individuals still 
recovered some of their predisability well-  being.18        A. B. Krueger, D. Kahneman, D. Schkade, N. Schwarz, and A. A. Stone
A focus on time use and activities suggests two factors in addition to 
hedonic adaptation for understanding the stability of SWB. First, although 
personality surely matters, the claim that an individual’s experienced happi-
ness must return to a set- point that is independent of local circumstances is 
probably false. For someone who enjoys socializing much more than com-
muting, a permanent reallocation of time from one of these activities to 
the other can be expected to have a permanent eﬀect on happiness (Lyubo-
mirsky, Sheldon, and Schkade 2005). Second, one must recognize that there 
are substantial substitution possibilities when it comes to activities. People 
who suﬀer injuries, for example, can substitute games like chess or checkers 
for competitive sports in their leisure time. These substitution possibilities 
are probably not anticipated. Thus, the largely unanticipated opportunity to 
substitute activities could attenuate the actual loss or gain in SWB associated 
with major changes in life circumstances, relative to anticipations.
A ﬁ  nal observation is that the withdrawal of attention is another mecha-
nism of adaptation to life changes. Attention is normally associated with 
novelty. Thus, the newly disabled, lottery winner, or newlywed are almost 
continuously aware of their state. But as the new state loses its novelty it 
ceases to be the exclusive focus of attention, and other aspects of life again 
evoke their varying hedonic responses. Research indicates that paraplegics 
are in a fairly good mood more than half the time as soon as one month 
after their crippling accident. Intuitive aﬀective forecasts will miss this pro-
cess of attentional adaptation, unless they are corrected by speciﬁ  c personal 
knowledge (Ubel et al. 2005).
1.2.3      The U-  Index: A Misery Index of Sorts
Two challenges for developing a measure of the process beneﬁ  t of an 
activity are that the scale of measurement is unclear, and diﬀerent people are 
likely to interpret the same scale diﬀerently. Indeed, modern utility theory in 
economics dispenses with the concept of cardinal utility in favor of prefer-
ence orderings.
Survey researchers try to anchor response categories to words that have 
a common and clear meaning across respondents, but there is no guarantee 
that respondents use the scales comparably. Despite the apparent signal in 
subjective well- being data (documented in the next section), one could legiti-
mately question whether one should give a cardinal interpretation to the 
numeric values attached to individuals’ responses about their life satisfaction 
or emotional states because of the potential for personal use of scales. This 
risk is probably exacerbated when it comes to comparisons across countries 
and cultures.
We propose an index, called the U-  index (for “unpleasant” or “undesir-
able”), designed to address both challenges.11 The U-  index measures the 
11. The remainder of this section borrows heavily and unabashedly from Kahneman and 
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proportion of time an individual spends in an unpleasant state. The average 
U-  index for a group of individuals can also be computed. This statistic has 
the virtue of being immediately understandable, and has other desirable 
properties as well. Most importantly, the U-  index is an ordinal measure 
at the level of feelings.
The ﬁ  rst step in computing the U-  index is to determine whether an epi-
sode is unpleasant or pleasant. There are many possible ways to classify an 
episode as unpleasant or pleasant. The data collected with Experience Sam-
pling Methods (ESM) or the Day Reconstruction Method (DRM) include 
descriptions of an individual’s emotional state during each episode in terms 
of intensity ratings on several dimensions of feelings, some of which are 
positive (e.g., “Happy,” “Enjoy myself,” “Friendly”) and some of which are 
negative (e.g., “Depressed,” “Angry,” “Frustrated”). We classify an episode 
as unpleasant if the most intense feeling reported for that episode is a nega-
tive one—that is, if the maximum rating on any of the negative aﬀect dimen-
sions is strictly greater than the maximum of rating of the positive aﬀect 
dimensions.12 Notice that this deﬁ  nition relies purely on an ordinal ranking 
of the feelings within each episode. Respondents can interpret the scales 
diﬀerently. It does not matter if respondent A uses the two to four portion 
of the zero to six intensity scale and Respondent B uses the full range. As 
long as they employ the same personal interpretation of the scale to report 
the intensity of their positive and negative emotions, the determination of 
which emotion was strongest is unaﬀected.13 It is reassuring to note that in 
cognitive testing conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, ten subjects 
were asked whether the aﬀective dimension that they gave the highest rating 
to was the most intense feeling they had during the episode, and all of the 
respondents said yes for each sampled episode.14
To deﬁ  ne the U-  index mathematically, let Iij be an indicator that equals 1 
if a time interval denoted j of duration hij for person i is considered unpleas-
ant and 0 otherwise. As mentioned previously, Iij equals 1 if the emotion 
that was rated as most intensive for that time interval is a negative one. For 
an individual, the U-  index over a given period of time is jIijhij/  jhij. For a 
group of N individuals, the U-  index is deﬁ  ned as:
 U   i
jIijhij 
jhij /   N.
12. Our approach bears some resemblance to a procedure proposed by Diener, Sandvik, 
and Pavot (1991), which categorized moments as unpleasant if the average rating of positive 
emotions was less than the average rating of negative emotions. Unlike the U-  index, however, 
averaging ratings of feelings requires a cardinal metric. Notice also that because the correlations 
between negative emotions tend to be low, their procedure will categorize fewer moments as 
unpleasant than the U-  index.
13. Formally, let f( ) be any monotonically increasing function. If P is the maximum inten-
sity of the positive emotions and N is the maximum intensity of the negative emotions, than 
f(P)  f(N) regardless of the monotonic transformation.
14. Memo from Kathy Downey, research psychologist, Oﬃce of Survey Methods Research, 
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Notice that the U-  index for a group is the equally weighted U-  index for 
the individuals in the group. The group U-  index can be interpreted as the 
average proportion of time that members of the group spend in an unpleas-
ant state.
From a psychological perspective, the U-  index has some desirable attri-
butes. First, the predominant emotional state for the majority of people 
during most of the time is positive, so any episode when a negative feeling 
is the most intense emotion is a signiﬁ  cant occurrence. It is not necessary to 
have more than one salient negative emotion for an episode to be unpleas-
ant. Second, the selection of a negative feeling as more intense than all 
positive ones is likely to be a mindful and deliberate choice: the maximal 
rating is salient, especially when it is negative, because negative feelings are 
relatively rare. Third, because at a given moment of time, the correlation of 
the intensity among various positive emotions across episodes is higher than 
the correlation among negative emotions, one dominant negative emotion 
probably colors an entire episode and it is potentially misleading to average 
negative emotions.
Of course, the dichotomous categorization of moments or episodes as 
unpleasant or pleasant obscures some information about the intensity of 
positive and negative emotions, just as a dichotomous deﬁ  nition of poverty 
misses the depths of material deprivation for those who are below the pov-
erty line. However, we see the ordinal deﬁ  nition of unpleasant episodes as 
a signiﬁ  cant advantage. In addition to reducing interpersonal diﬀerences 
in the use of scales, the question of how to numerically scale subjective 
responses is no longer an issue with our dichotomous measure. The categori-
zation of moments into unpleasant and pleasant moments emphasizes what 
can be most conﬁ  dently measured from subjective data.
The U- index can be used to compare individuals (what proportion of the 
time is this person in an unpleasant emotional state?), demographic groups 
(do men or women spend a higher proportion of time in an emotional state 
considered unpleasant?), and situations. The U- index can also be aggregated 
to the country level (what proportion of time do people in France spend in 
an emotional state classiﬁ  ed as unpleasant) and can be used to compare 
countries. Notice that because the U-  index is aggregated based on time, 
it takes on useful cardinal properties. Like the poverty rate, for example, 
one could compute that the U-  index is X percent lower for one group than 
another, or has fallen by Y percent from one year to another.
1.3      Is There Useful Signal in What People Report 
About Their Subjective Experiences?
Economists often treat self- reported data with a high degree of suspicion, 
especially when those data pertain to subjective internal states, such as well-
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subjective experiences? To answer this question, we ﬁ  rst discuss how social 
scientists assess the validity of self-  reports of behavior and subsequently 
develop a strategy for assessing the validity of self-  reports of subjective 
experiences before we turn to relevant empirical ﬁ  ndings. Following the 
review of the evidence, we identify some limiting conditions and highlight 
that self-  reports of aﬀect are most meaningful when they pertain to recent 
speciﬁ  c episodes in a person’s life, a fact that we exploit later in the design 
of the Day Reconstruction Method and the Princeton Aﬀect and Time- use 
Survey.
1.3.1    Rationale
Many surveys ask respondents to report on their behavior. The validity 
of such reports can be assessed by comparing them with external records 
at the individual or aggregate level. For example, banking records can be 
used to evaluate the validity of self-  reported expenditures at the individual 
level (e.g., Blair and Burton 1987), and national sales ﬁ  gures can be used 
to assess the validity of purchase reports in representative sample surveys 
at the aggregate level (e.g., Sudman and Wansink 2002). Neither of these 
strategies is feasible for assessing the validity of self-  reported feelings, like 
moods, emotions, worries, or pain. Feelings are subjective experiences and 
the ﬁ  nal arbiter is the person who experiences them. The same holds for 
other subjective evaluations, like reports of life-  satisfaction, which pertain 
to individuals’ subjective assessments of the quality of their lives. The sub-
jective nature of feelings and evaluations precludes direct validation against 
objective records. It is also expected that comparisons of subjective and 
objective reports will not be identical, because people interpret the objective 
world in idiosyncratic ways.
Nevertheless, one can gauge the validity of these reports in other, less 
direct ways. To begin with, one can assess interpersonal agreement: do “close 
others” perceive the person in ways that are compatible with the person’s 
self-  reports? While interpersonal agreement is comforting, it is less than 
compelling and subject to numerous biasing factors. As a more informative 
alternative, one can relate self-  reports of subjective experience to objective 
outcomes with the expectation that there should be at least a modest cor-
respondence. If reports of positive aﬀect are associated with increased lon-
gevity, for example, they obviously capture something real—yet it remains 
unclear whether that something is indeed positive aﬀect or some other 
variable correlated with its expression (the so-  called “third variable” expla-
nation). Perhaps people who present themselves in a positive light when 
answering questions also follow other strategies of social interaction that 
reduce daily friction and beneﬁ  t health. Such ambiguities are attenuated 
when studies that do not rely on self-  reports for the assessment of aﬀect 
show similar results. Finally, interpretative ambiguities are further attenu-
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naturalistic observation; for example, when induced positive aﬀect also has 
beneﬁ  cial health consequences. Such supporting results will typically be 
more limited in scope due to ethical constraints on the experimental induc-
tion of aﬀect (especially negative aﬀective states such as stress or anger) and 
the more limited time frame of experimental studies.
We next review illustrative ﬁ  ndings from longitudinal studies that show 
self- reported aﬀect predicts some important objective outcomes in life. Par-
alleling these naturalistic observations, a growing number of experimental 
studies documents compatible eﬀects of induced aﬀect, based on random 
assignment of participants to positive or negative “aﬀect induction” con-
ditions. For example, positive aﬀect can be induced by giving subjects a 
cookie or placing a dime in a spot where they can ﬁ  nd it. Other approaches 
to inducing aﬀect include placing subjects in a situation where they overhear 
a compliment or insult, showing subjects a funny versus sad movie, asking 
subjects to recall a happy versus sad event, and giving subjects a task that is 
easy or impossible to perform; see Schwarz and Strack (1999).
1.3.2    Aﬀect and Objective Outcomes: Social Life
In a comprehensive review of cross-  sectional and longitudinal studies, 
Lyubomirsky, King, and Diener (2005) observed that a preponderance of 
positive over negative aﬀect predicts numerous beneﬁ  cial outcomes, from 
the quality of one’s social life and work life to longevity and the quality of 
one’s health. Here, we focus on studies that are particularly informative with 
regard to the validity of aﬀective self-  reports, namely studies in which (a) 
the person’s aﬀect was assessed through self- reports several months or years 
prior to the observed outcome; (b) the outcome itself is objective (e.g., lon-
gevity or health status rather than subjective satisfaction with one’s health); 
and (c) studies in which the aﬀect assessment is not based on self-  reports 
show compatible eﬀects.
Finding a Spouse
Most people would prefer to be married to a partner who is happy and sat-
isﬁ  ed rather than depressed and dissatisﬁ  ed. Consistent with this preference, 
several longitudinal studies show that people who report in sample surveys 
that they are happy (Marks and Fleming 1999) or satisﬁ  ed with their lives 
(Lucas et al. 2003; Spanier and Fuerstenberg 1982) are indeed more likely 
to marry in the following years. For example, Marks and Fleming (1999) 
observed in a ﬁ  fteen-  year longitudinal study with a representative sample 
of young Australians that those who were 1 standard deviation above the 
mean of happiness reports were 1.5 times more likely to marry in the ensu-
ing years; those 2 standard deviations above the mean were twice as likely to 
marry.
This relationship can also be observed with measures of aﬀect that do not 
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expressed in women’s college yearbook photographs, following the well-
 established procedures of Ekman’s facial action coding system (Ekman and 
Rosenberg 1997). They observed that women who expressed genuine positive 
aﬀect (in the form of a Duchenne smile) at age twenty- one were more likely 
to be married by age twenty-  seven and less likely to remain single through 
middle adulthood. Of course, people may report being happy because they 
anticipate being married in the next year, but the long lag in the Ekman and 
Rosenberg study is harder to reconcile with reverse causality.
Helping Others
Several studies show that self-  reported daily mood is associated with the 
likelihood of helping others. For example, Lucas (2001) observed that stu-
dents who reported a preponderance of positive mood in their daily dia-
ries also reported spending more time helping others than did those with 
less positive moods. Similarly, Csikszentmihalyi, Patton, and Lucas (1997) 
found that self-  reported helping behavior increased with the percentage of 
time spent in a good mood among school-  age youths.
Numerous experimental studies, with random assignment to diﬀerent 
aﬀect induction conditions, support the link between positive mood and 
prosocial behavior. People in induced positive moods are more likely to help 
others by donating money (Cunningham, Steinberg, and Grev 1980), blood 
(O’Malley and Andrews 1983), and time (Berkowitz 1987) to worthy causes. 
Receiving a cookie or ﬁ  nding a dime is suﬃcient to elicit increased prosocial 
behavior (Isen and Levin 1972).
Income
Several studies show a positive relationship between self- reported positive 
aﬀect at a given time and later income. Diener et al. (2002) observed that 
self-  reported cheerfulness at college entry predicted income sixteen years 
later, controlling for numerous other variables, including parents’ income. 
For example, the most cheerful oﬀspring of well- oﬀ parents earned $25,000 
more per year than the least cheerful oﬀspring. Similarly, Marks and Flem-
ing (1999) observed in their Australian panel study of young adults that 
respondents’ self-  reported happiness in one wave predicted the size of the 
pay raises they had received by the time of the next interview, two years later. 
Finally, Russian respondents who reported high happiness in 1995 enjoyed 
higher incomes in 2000 and were less likely to have experienced unemploy-
ment in the meantime (Graham, Eggers, and Sukhtankar 2006).
1.3.3    Aﬀect and Objective Outcomes: Health
Numerous longitudinal studies show that happy people have a better 
chance to live a long and healthy life (for reviews see Lyubomirsky, King, 
and Diener [2005]; Howell, Kern, and Lyubomirsky [2007]). This observa-
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moreover, it is supported by studies that relied on aﬀect measures other than 
self- report.
Mortality
Based on data of the Berlin Aging Study, Maier and Smith (1999) reported 
that a preponderance of self- reported positive over negative aﬀect (assessed 
with the Positive and negative aﬀect schedule [PANAS]) predicted mortal-
ity in a sample of 513 older adults three to six years later. Studies with 
clinical samples reinforce this observation. For example, Devins et al. (1990) 
observed that end- stage renal patients who reported overall happiness were 
more likely to survive over a four year period than were their less happy 
peers. Similarly, Levy et al. (1988) found that women who reported more 
joy in life were more likely to survive a recurrence of breast cancer over a 
seven year period. Studies based on personality tests that assess enduring 
aﬀective predisposition replicate this conclusion (see Lyubomirsky, King, 
and Diener [2005] for a review).
Complementary support for the observed relationship between positive 
aﬀect and mortality comes from studies that asked the interviewer to rate 
the respondent’s aﬀective state. In one study (Zuckerman, Kasl, and Ostfeld 
1984), healthy as well as unhealthy respondents who were rated as happier 
enjoyed lower mortality than their peers over a two-  year period; Palmore 
(1969) replicated this observation over a more impressive period of ﬁ  fteen 
years. Finally, in a study that attracted broad attention, Snowdon and his 
colleagues (Danner, Snowdon, and Friesen 2001; Snowdon 2001) analyzed 
autobiographical essays that young catholic nuns of the American School 
Sisters of Notre Dame had written in 1930, when most were in their early 
twenties. Coding the essays for emotional content, they discovered that posi-
tive aﬀect expressed in these early essays was highly predictive of mortality 
by the time the writers were eighty to ninety years old. On average, nuns 
whose essays placed them in the top quartile of positive aﬀect in the sample 
lived ten years longer than nuns whose essays placed them in the bottom 
quartile. Given that all nuns lived under highly comparable conditions in 
terms of daily routines, diet, and health care, this ﬁ  nding provides particu-
larly compelling evidence for the repeatedly observed relationship between 
positive aﬀect and longevity.
Physiological Associations
Several conceptual models in the ﬁ  elds of health psychology and behav-
ioral medicine posit a central role for positive and negative aﬀect in the trans-
lation of the psychosocial environment into physiological states and, sub-
sequently, health outcomes, such as those mentioned previously. Empirical 
demonstrations of aﬀect- physiology associations are a compelling source of 
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systems—the immune system and the endocrine system—because of their 
close linkage with health outcomes.
Immune Response
Alterations in immune system functioning—either above or below nor-
mative levels—can result in greater susceptibility to invading organisms and 
neoplastic diseases, and to autoimmune conditions. Therefore, many studies 
have examined how psychosocial factors and aﬀect are related to various 
compartments of the immune system.
Several longitudinal studies observed that the frequency of self-  reported 
hassles and uplifts and their accompanying aﬀect is predictive of immune 
response. In one daily study, Evans et al. (1993) related participants’ daily 
reports of life-  events and mood over a two-  week period to markers of 
immune function in daily saliva samples. They observed a higher secretion 
of immunoglobulin A on days that were characterized by many positive 
and few negative events. Stone and colleagues showed through their daily 
studies of events, mood, and symptoms that the impact of daily events on 
the secretory immune system was mediated through changes in negative and 
positive aﬀect associated with daily events (Stone et al. 1987; Stone et al. 
1996). A similar line of work by Vitaliano et al. (1998) monitored natural 
killer (NK) cell activity in cancer survivors. They found that participants 
who reported more uplifts than hassles (and presumably decreased levels of 
negative aﬀect based on prior work [Stone 1987]) in daily life showed higher 
NK cell activity eighteen months later, an indicator of enhanced immune 
function.
Moving to more major events, a classic extensive line of work by Kiecolt-
  Glaser and colleagues demonstrated that naturalistic situations such as 
students taking exams or maritally distressed individuals discussing their 
marital situation results in declines in immune functioning (e.g., Kiecolt-
  Glaser et al. 1988). Changes in the immune system have been shown by the 
same investigators to have health consequences, such as in the resolution of 
experimentally induced wounds.
A particularly interesting series of studies by Cohen and colleagues dem-
onstrated that people’s level of aﬀect is associated with their susceptibility to 
an experimentally induced viral infection and this is strongly supportive of 
the role of aﬀect in physiology. In particular, recent evidence has indicated 
that proinﬂ  ammatory cytokines are associated with positive aﬀect (Doyle, 
Gentile, and Cohen 2006) when measured on a daily basis.
Beneﬁ  cial immune function eﬀects of positive aﬀect were also observed 
in experimental studies, based on random assignment to diﬀerent aﬀect 
induction conditions. For example, watching a humorous video clip has 
been found to increase NK cell activity and several other immune function 
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Minchoﬀ, and Baker 1985) and salivary lysozyme (sLys) concentration 
(Perera et al. 1998). Induction of stressful situations has also produced 
changes in immune function. For example, Stone et al. (1993) exposed 
participants to challenging mental tasks and they subsequently had lower 
responsiveness of t-  cells stimulated with standard antigens compared to 
participants who were not exposed. A recent review article by Marsland, 
Pressman, and Cohen (2007) concludes that positive aﬀect is associated with 
up-  regulation of the immune system.
Hormones
Many bodily functions are regulated by the actions of hormones, which 
are biological active substances secreted by various organ systems. One 
hormone that has been of particular interest to psychosocial researchers is 
cortisol, a product of the hypothamalic-  pituatary-  adrenal (HPA) system. 
Cortisol is often called the “stress hormone.” It aﬀects aspects of metabo-
lism in general, but of special interest for this discussion is its impact of the 
immune system and its anti-inﬂ  ammatory role.
Observational and experimental studies have conﬁ  rmed that cortisol 
levels are responsive to changes in aﬀect and to experiences that are closely 
linked with aﬀect changes. In an impressive line of research, Kirschbaum 
and colleagues (Kirschbaum, Pirke, and Hellhammer 1993) showed that a 
laboratory manipulation involving stressful student presentations quickly 
increased levels of cortisol; such changes could at least temporarily sup-
press the immune system. Supporting the experimental work, there is evi-
dence from naturalistic studies that sampled respondents’ aﬀect and cortisol 
repeatedly throughout the day. Those studies showed that momentary nega-
tive aﬀect is associated with higher levels of cortisol and positive aﬀect with 
lower levels of cortisol (relative to when aﬀect levels were at the opposite 
level) (Smyth et al. 1998). Furthermore, both state (momentary) and trait 
measurement of aﬀect is associated in the same manner with cortisol levels 
(Polk et al. 2005).
Neurological Activity
Findings from neuroscience research also lend some support for the view 
that subjective reports are related to individuals’ emotional states. By way 
of background, note that there is strong clinical and experimental evidence 
that the left prefrontal cortex of the brain is associated with the processing 
of approach and pleasure, whereas the corresponding area in the right 
hemisphere is active in the processing of avoidance and aversive stimuli. 
In particular, the left prefrontal cortex is more active when individuals are 
exposed to pleasant images or asked to think happy thoughts, while the 
right prefrontal cortex is more active when individuals are shown unpleasant 
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psychological well-  being reported a statistically signiﬁ  cant correlation of 
0.30 between survey evidence on life satisfaction and the left- right diﬀerence 
in brain activation (Urry et al. 2004).
In a striking demonstration of the validity of subjective reports, Coghill 
and colleagues compared subjects’ self-  reported pain levels to functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while applying a standardized pain 
stimulus to seventeen subjects. The pain stimulus consisted of hot presses 
against the lower leg. They found that individuals reporting higher levels of 
pain to the thermal pain stimulus produced greater activation of various cor-
tical regions of the brain, some of which corresponded with the stimulated 
limb, than individuals who reported lower pain ratings to the same stimulus 
(see ﬁ  gure 1.1; Coghill, McHaﬃe, and Yen [2003]). The strong implication of 
this work is that variation in self-  reports to standard stimuli are not simply 
a function of interpersonal diﬀerences in scale usage, but reﬂ  ect, at least in 
part, diﬀerential neural processes associated with the perception of pain. 
They concluded, “By identifying objective neural correlates of subjective 
diﬀerences, these ﬁ  ndings validate the utility of introspection and subjective 
reporting as a means of communicating a ﬁ  rst-  person experience” (8358).
Other Systems
Levels of positive and negative aﬀect have also been associated with and 
shown to aﬀect other physiological systems and we mention some of them 
here. Positive aﬀect has been shown to increase performance on cognitive 
tasks and this could be associated with brain dopamine levels (Ashby, Isen, 
and Turken 1999). Relatedly, measures of brain activity have been associ-
ated with aﬀective levels (Wheeler, Davidson, and Tomarken 1993). Some 
aspects of cardiovascular function and aﬀect have been studied. Shapiro and 
colleagues (Shapiro, Jamner, and Goldstein 1997) used daily monitoring of 
aﬀect and blood pressure to show that speciﬁ  c mood states such as anger 
were associated with increased levels of blood pressure.
1.3.4    Assessing  Subjective  Experiences
As our review indicates, there is systematic signal in people’s self-  reports 
of their aﬀective experiences. Nevertheless, self-  reports of aﬀect are sub-
ject to systematic methodological biases, which depend on the assessment 
method used. Next, we summarize what has been learned (for reviews see 
Robinson and Clore [2002]; Schwarz [2007]).
When people report on their current feelings, the feelings themselves 
are accessible to introspection, allowing for more accurate reports on the 
basis of experiential information. But aﬀective experiences are ﬂ  eeting and 
not available to introspection once the feeling dissipated. Accordingly, the 
op  portunity to assess emotion reports based on experiential information 
is limited to methods of momentary data capture (Stone et al. 2007) like Frequency













Fig. 1.1    Brain regions displaying diﬀerent frequencies of activation between high-   
and low-  (pain rating) sensitivity subgroups
Source: Reproduced from: Coghill, McHaﬃe, and Yen (2003). Please see original image for 
references to color in the following note.
Notes: Circles are centered on regions where the peak diﬀerences between groups were lo-
cated. Colors in A and C correspond to the number of individuals displaying statistically 
signiﬁ  cant activation at a given voxel (frequency), whereas colors in B and D correspond to 
the z-  score of the subgroup analysis. Slice locations in A and B are –  2 mm from the midline, 
whereas slice locations in B and C are 32 mm from the midline (in standard stereotaxic space). 
Structural MRI data (gray) are averaged across all individuals involved in corresponding func-
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experience sampling (Stone, Shiﬀman, and DeVries 1999), which we address 
in more detail in section 1.4. Once the feeling dissipated, the aﬀective expe-
riences need to be reconstructed on the basis of other information. When 
the report pertains to a speciﬁ  c recent episode, people can draw on episodic 
memory, retrieving speciﬁ  c moments and details of the recent past. Such 
reports can often recover the actual experience with some accuracy, as indi-
cated by their convergence with concurrent reports (e.g., Kahneman et al. 
2004; Stone et al. 2006). The Day Reconstruction Method, presented in 
section 1.4, takes advantage of this observation.
In contrast, global reports of past feelings are based on semantic knowl-
edge. When asked how they “usually” feel during a particular activity, people 
draw on their general beliefs about the activity and its attributes to arrive at 
a report. The actual experience does not ﬁ  gure prominently in these global 
reports because the experience itself is no longer accessible to introspection 
and episodic reconstruction is not used to answer a global question. Finally, 
the same semantic knowledge serves as a basis for predicting future feel-
ings, for which episodic information is not available to begin with (Schwarz, 
Kahne  man, and Xu 2009; Xu and Schwarz 2009). These hedonic predic-
tions, in turn, often serve as a basis for behavioral choice (March 1978).
These processes result in a systematic pattern of convergences and diver-
gences in aﬀect reports. First, concurrent reports and retrospective reports 
pertaining to speciﬁ  c recent episodes usually show good convergence, pro-
vided that the episode is suﬃciently recent to allow detailed reinstantiation 
in episodic memory. Second, retrospective global reports of past feelings and 
predictions of future feelings also show good convergence, given that both 
are based on the same semantic inputs. Hence, global memories are likely to 
“conﬁ  rm” predictions. Third, choices are based on predicted hedonic con-
sequences, and are therefore usually consistent with predictions and global 
memories. However, fourth, global retrospective reports as well as predic-
tions and choices will often diverge from concurrent and episodic reports, 
given that the diﬀerent types of reports are based on diﬀerent inputs. As a 
result, a person’s expectations and global memories go hand in hand, but 
often fail to reﬂ  ect what the person actually experienced moment to moment 
(for a review see Schwarz, Kahneman, and Xu 2009).
These observations have important implications for the assessment of 
aﬀective experience in time-  use studies. They highlight that global reports 
of how much one usually enjoys a given activity are a fallible indicator of 
people’s actual aﬀective experience in situ. Such global reports were used 
in Juster and colleagues’ pioneering studies (e.g., Juster and Staﬀord 1985). 
Our work builds on Juster’s (1985) conceptual approach while heeding the 
lessons learned from recent psychological research by employing measures 
of aﬀective experience that pertain to speciﬁ  c episodes of the preceding day. 
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1.4      Methods for Collecting Evaluated Time-  Use Data: 
From EMA to DRM to PATS
The Experience Sampling Method (ESM) and Ecological Momentary 
Assessment (EMA) were developed to collect information on people’s 
reported feelings in real time in natural settings during selected moments 
of the day (Csikszentmihalyi 1990; Stone and Shiﬀman 1994). Participants 
in real-  time studies carry a handheld computer that prompts them several 
times during the course of the day (or days) to answer a set of questions 
immediately.15 Participants are typically shown several menus, on which they 
indicate their physical location, the activities in which they were engaged 
just before they were prompted, and the people with whom they were inter-
acting. They also report their current subjective experience by indicating the 
extent to which they feel the presence or absence of various feelings, such 
as angry, happy, tired, and impatient. Momentary real-  time surveys are 
often viewed as the gold standard for collecting data on aﬀective experience 
because it minimizes eﬀects of judgment and of memory. As a convention, 
we will refer to studies that collect data on emotions in real time as ESM 
studies throughout the remainder of the chapter (because we are focusing 
on experience rather than environmental features).
So far, however, real-  time data collection has proved prohibitively ex  -
pensive and burdensome to administer to large, representative samples. 
An alternative to ESM that relies on a short recall period is the Day Recon-
struction Method (DRM), which is described in Kahneman et al. (2004). 
The DRM combines elements of experience sampling and time diaries, and 
is designed speciﬁ  cally to facilitate accurate emotional recall.16 Respon-
dents—who participated in the survey in a central location—were provided 
with four packets containing separate questionnaires, and were asked to 
answer them in sequence. The ﬁ  rst packet had standard questions on life, 
health, and work satisfaction and demographics. Satisfaction questions were 
asked ﬁ  rst so that answers were not contaminated by the other questions and 
diary that followed. Second, respondents ﬁ  lled out a time diary summarizing 
episodes that occurred in the preceding day. The third packet asked respon-
dents to describe each episode of the day by indicating the following: when 
the episode began and ended, what they were doing (by selecting activities 
from a provided list), where they were, and with whom they were interact-
ing. To ascertain how they felt during each episode in regards to selected 
aﬀective dimensions, respondents were also asked to report the intensity of 
their feelings along twelve categories on a scale from zero (“Not at all”) to 
six (“Very Much”). The aﬀective categories were speciﬁ  ed by descriptors, 
15. Other survey technologies can also be used for EMA, such as paper diaries and cell 
phones.
16. Robinson and Godbey (1997), Gershuny and Halpin (1996), and Michelson (2005) have 
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mostly adjectives, such as happy, worried/  anxious, and angry/  hostile. The 
anchor, “Not at all,” is intended to be a natural zero point that has a com-
mon meaning across respondents for these descriptors. The ﬁ  nal packet 
contained personality and work questions. Subjects were paid $75 for ﬁ  lling 
out the DRM questionnaire, which usually took forty-  ﬁ  ve to seventy-  ﬁ  ve 
minutes to complete.
The emotions that respondents were asked to rate for each episode in 
the DRM were selected in part to represent points along the Russell (1980) 
aﬀect circumplex. This distinguishes the DRM from the small number of 
past diary studies that included a question on how much individuals enjoyed 
(or liked/  disliked) the activity they were doing. Russell models emotions as 
consisting of two core dimensions, pleasantness (pleasant versus unpleas-
ant) and activation (aroused versus unexcited), with emotions positioned 
on a circle in this space. We interpret the duration-  weighted average of the 
reported aﬀect intensities as the average ﬂ  ow of “process beneﬁ  ts” or expe-
rienced well-  being during the interval.
An early version of the Day Reconstruction Method was applied to a 
sample of 909 working women in Dallas and Austin, which we refer to 
Survey Techniques for Collecting Data on Evaluated Time Use
Experience Sample Method (ESM) and Ecological Momentary As-
sessment (EMA). ESM and EMA are techniques for collecting data 
on time use and emotional experiences in real time. Respondents 
typically carry a computer device (a Personal Digital Assistant, called 
a PDA, for example) and indicate features of their activity and the 
feelings prior to being signaled by the device. EMA studies typically 
collect environmental information as well and may include physio-
logical measurements (e.g., blood pressure, cortisol).
Day Reconstruction Method (DRM). DRM is a paper-  and-  pencil 
questionnaire that ﬁ  rst collects time diary information from individ-
uals for the preceding day. The diaries can list personal details, as they 
are not collected. Then, for each indicated episode, individuals indi-
cate the nature of the activity, who was present, and the extent to 
which various emotions were present or absent.
Princeton Aﬀect and Time Survey (PATS). PATS is a telephone sur-
vey patterned after the American Time Use Survey. After individuals 
report the activities of the preceding day (who with, what doing, 
where, when started and ended), three ﬁ  fteen-  minute intervals are 
randomly sampled and respondents are asked the extent to which 
various emotions were present or absent during that time.32        A. B. Krueger, D. Kahneman, D. Schkade, N. Schwarz, and A. A. Stone
as the Texas DRM (Kahneman et al. 2004).17 Another DRM survey was 
conducted of 810 women in Columbus, Ohio and 820 women in Rennes, 
France in the spring of 2005.18 A major goal of the Texas DRM study was 
to determine whether, despite its reliance on memory, the DRM reproduces 
results found in ESM. We looked in particular for features of experience 
captured by ESM and DRM that deviate from people’s lay intuitions. If 
DRM reproduces these patterns we can conclude that it captures respon-
dents’ actual experiences during the preceding day rather than their general 
intuitions about what their experiences “must have been like.” One com-
parison along these lines is shown in ﬁ  gure 1.2, which shows hourly mean 
ratings of “tired” in the DRM and from an independent study that used 
experience sampling. Whereas people’s intuitions might hold that tiredness 
rises monotonically throughout the day, ESM studies show that tiredness 
reaches a minimum around noon. The DRM data replicate this V-  shaped 
pattern, and the results obtained with ESM and DRM methods are remark-
ably similar. Moreover, this V- shaped pattern of tiredness was found in four 
subsequent DRM studies.
Other results of the Texas DRM conformed reasonably well to basic results 
frequently observed in Experience Sampling, despite diﬀerences in the sample 
demographics.19 For example, the incidence of negative emotions is relatively 
rare in DRM—“angry/  hostile” was rated above zero only 23 percent of the 
time, while feeling “happy” was rated above zero 95 percent of the time. The 
same pattern is found in ESM studies. The correlations among the emo-
tions, particularly the positive ones, were quite high across episodes—around 
0.7 for positive emotions and 0.4 for negative emotions. This pattern also 
replicates ESM ﬁ  ndings. For example, the correlation of happy and “enjoy-
ing myself” across episodes is 0.73 in the DRM and 0.80 for a specialized 
sample of arthritis patients who participated in an ESM study.20 Unfortu-
nately, we are not aware of a real-  time data capture study that collected suf-
ﬃciently comparable data to compare activity ratings in the two methods.
Though not deﬁ  nitive, these ﬁ  ndings suggest that DRM provides a rea-
sonable approximation to the results of the more demanding ESM.
We also compared the DRM to a set of general activity judgment ques-
tions that closely replicated Juster (1985). Speciﬁ  cally, we asked the follow-
ing questions shown in table 1.1 to 252 women in Texas in 2002 who were 
recruited in the same fashion as the Texas DRM sample.
17. The sample consisted of 535 respondents who were recruited through random selection 
from the driver’s license list plus a screen for employment and age eighteen to sixty, and another 
374 workers in three occupations: nurses, telemarketers, and teachers. Because most results were 
similar for both subsamples, we present results for the full sample.
18. Sampled individuals were identiﬁ  ed by random-  digit dialing.
19. See Kahneman et al. (2004) for further examples of nonintuitive patterns obtained with 
both methods.
20. This correlation was computed using a sample of eighty- four arthritis patients who were 
prompted to report their feelings on a zero to 100 visual analog scale three to twelve times a 
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We then used just the adjective “enjoy” on a zero to six scale from the Texas 
DRM to compute the average reported enjoyment while women engaged in 
these thirteen activities according to the diary study. Table 1.2 compares the 
ranking of activities from the two approaches. The correlation between the 
ranks is 0.69. With small samples and some possible diﬀerential selection as 
to who participated in the activities on the diary day, the results should be 
read cautiously. Still, the results of the global ratings are quite similar to 
Juster (1985). The original Juster survey found that work and child care 
ranked particularly highly in terms of enjoyment, while our replication sur-
vey ﬁ  nds a similar result, especially for child care. More important, how-
ever, the DRM aﬀect reports paint a diﬀerent picture. For example, child 
care is reported as more enjoyable when asked about as an activity than in 
the diary-  based study.21 Work is ranked eighth in the Juster-  like survey, 
Fig. 1.2    Comparison of pattern of tiredness over the day based on DRM and 
ESM samples
Source: Kahneman et al. (2004).
Note: Points are standard scores computed across hourly averages within each sample.
21. Robinson and Godbey (1997) found a similar result comparing his diary-  based study 
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perhaps not as highly as in the original because of our focus on women, but 
still higher than in the DRM. Interestingly, socializing after work is ranked 
much more highly in the DRM than in the general activity question. The 
contrast between these results, together with the contrast between the DRM 
and the original Juster rankings of activities, highlights the importance of 
collecting event-  based data. Asking people to respond about how they feel 
about activities in general tends to provide a diﬀerent ranking than when 
their actual experiences are used to guide their reported feelings during those 
activities (for a more detailed discussion see Schwarz Kahneman, and Xu 
2009).22
1.4.1      PATS: A Phone Survey Version of DRM
The DRM is also burdensome and diﬃcult to implement in a national 
sample. We designed the Princeton Aﬀect and Time Survey to collect data 
22. Gershuny and Halpin (1996) also cast doubt on the utility of general activity judgments. 
They analyzed data from a survey of British married couples in 1986 that asked a set of general 
questions about enjoyment with various activities. Respondents also maintained a diary for 
ﬁ  ve days in which they reported their main activity during thirty- minute intervals and, for each 
interval, how much they enjoyed their main activity, on a scale of 1 (very much) to 5 (not at 
all). Looking across subjects for a given activity, the proportion of the variation in the diary-
  derived enjoyment scale explained by the corresponding general activity enjoyment response 
was low, only 11 percent for supervising kids and 10 percent for cooking. Thus, people did a 
poor job predicting their own reported emotional experiences with a general activity enjoy-
ment question.
Table 1.1  Juster-  like question in our replication survey
We would like to learn how likable or dislikable various activities are. Below we list a number 
of diﬀerent things that you may often likely to do in your life. For each one, please circle the 
response that indicates how much you like or dislike it: (if one does not apply to you, you 
may skip it)
  Dislike a   Like a 
  great deal  great deal
Commuting to work –5 –4 –3 –2 –1 012345
Working in your main job –5 –4 –3 –2 –1 012345
Having lunch on a workday –5 –4 –3 –2 –1 012345
Socializing at work –5 –4 –3 –2 –1 012345
Commuting to home from work –5 –4 –3 –2 –1 012345
Socializing with friends –5 –4 –3 –2 –1 012345
Talking on the phone at home –5 –4 –3 –2 –1 012345
Taking care of your children –5 –4 –3 –2 –1 012345
Doing housework –5 –4 –3 –2 –1 012345
Cooking/preparing food –5 –4 –3 –2 –1 012345
Having dinner on a workday –5 –4 –3 –2 –1 012345
Relaxing at home –5 –4 –3 –2 –1 012345
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from respondents over the phone more expeditiously. A related goal was to 
develop a module that could be added to the U.S.’ main time- use survey, the 
ATUS. The PATS survey works as follows. We started with the BLS ATUS 
questionnaire and eliminated a small number of questions that were not rele-
vant. Respondents were ﬁ  rst asked to describe each episode (deﬁ  ned as an 
interval of time in which the respondent was engaged in a speciﬁ  ed activity; 
the average respondent reported 17.8 episodes) of the preceding day, using 
the ATUS protocols. Information about the activity individuals engaged 
in—what they were doing, where they were, and who was with them—was 
collected for each episode.
After the entire day was described in this manner, three episodes were 
randomly selected in proportion to duration and without replacement.23 
For these episodes, respondents were asked a ﬁ  ve-  minute module of ques-
tions, covering the extent to which they experienced six diﬀerent feelings 
(pain, happy, tired, stressed, sad, and interested) during each episode on a 
scale from zero to six. They were instructed that a zero meant they did not 
experience the feeling at all at the time and a six meant the feeling was very 
strong. Speciﬁ  cally, respondents were asked to report their feelings dur-
ing a randomly selected ﬁ  fteen-  minute interval of the sampled episodes. 
They were also reminded of what activity they said they were doing at that 
time in the diary part of the questionnaire. The order in which the feelings 
were presented was randomly assigned across respondents from six diﬀerent 
permutations. The sampled episodes were ordered chronologically in the 
Table 1.2  Rank of activities in terms of average enjoyment from DRM and general 
activity enjoyment question similar to Juster (1985)
  Activity   DRM (enjoy)  Juster enjoy/dislike 
Child care 9 2
Commuting from work 12 11





Phone at home 7 10
Relaxing 2 1
Socializing after work 1 7
Socializing at work 6 5
Watching TV 5 6
  Working   11   8  
23. More speciﬁ  cally, the BLAISE computer program divided the day into ﬁ  fteen-  minute 
intervals and randomly selected three ﬁ  fteen-  minute intervals. If any of those intervals was in 
the same episode, additional ﬁ  fteen-  minute intervals were selected that were in other episodes 
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 module. We also collected information on whether the individual was inter-
acting with someone during sampled episodes.
The adjectives used in the PATS only partially overlap with those used 
in our DRM studies for a few reasons. First, we asked a smaller number of 
adjectives to save respondent time. Second, we avoided using compound 
adjectives, which we thought could be confusing to respondents over the 
phone. Third, the Gallup Organization conducted a set of twenty- ﬁ  ve cogni-
tive interviews with respondents to check their understanding of the aﬀect 
questions and to make sure the questions made sense during most nonsleep-
ing activities. These interviews helped us narrow down the set of emotions 
asked about.
The survey was administered by the Gallup Organization on our behalf 
in a random digit dial telephone survey of U.S. residents from May to Au-
gust of 2006. Interviews were conducted in English and Spanish. A total of 
3,982 people completed the survey, for a response rate of 37 percent. Weights 
were developed by Gallup to make the sample representative of the general 
population in terms of geographic region, gender, age, and race. The weights 
were based on counts from the Current Population Survey (CPS). Sixty- one 
percent of the unweighted respondents were women, a majority were white 
(88 percent), 90 percent had a high school education or higher, and 40 per-
cent had household income less than $40,000 per year. The average age was 
51.4 years. Reweighting the sample to represent the population resulted in 
some signiﬁ  cant distributional changes. Most notably, compared with the 
unweighted sample, the weighted sample had fewer women (53 percent), 
higher income (36 percent below $40,000), and a lower average age (45.2 
years). Unless otherwise noted, we apply sample weights in all of the statis-
tics we report based on PATS.
1.4.2    Evaluating  PATS
We will use the PATS to illustrate NTA, so it is important to evaluate its 
properties in comparison to other time-  use data sets and in comparison to 
results for aﬀective experience captured in ESM and DRM.
Figure 1.3 shows that the allocation of time across activities (weighting 
individuals by sample weights) from the PATS closely matches that in the 
ATUS for the same months of 2004 and 2005. The correlation between time 
spent in these activities from the two surveys is an impressive 0.99. This 
high concordance suggests that the weighted sample is representative of the 
population, at least in terms of time use.
In ﬁ  gure 1.4 we show the distribution of responses to the questions about 
feeling happy and tired over episodes in the PATS and Texas DRM. These 
adjectives were selected because they display diﬀerent patterns—strongly 
skewed to the left for happy and slightly skewed to the left for tired except 
for a prominent mode at zero. It is reassuring that the distributions are very 
similar in both methods. Moreover, the incidence of reports of negative 
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We can also compare correlations between feelings across episodes in 
PATS to those in DRM and ESM. The correlation between feeling happy 
and feeling tired, for example, is –  0.13 for women in the PATS, –  0.21 in 
the Texas DRM survey of women, and –  0.34 in a Columbus, Ohio DRM 
survey of women. The correlation between feeling happy and stressed is 
–  0.29 across women’s episodes in PATS, and –  0.44 in the Columbus DRM. 
Fig. 1.3    Average hours per major activity in PATS and ATUS
Notes: PATS shown in black and ATUS in white. PATS was conducted in May–  August 2006 
and ATUS is for May–  August 2004–  05.
Fig. 1.4    Distribution of reported happiness and tired in PATS and DRM38        A. B. Krueger, D. Kahneman, D. Schkade, N. Schwarz, and A. A. Stone
The correlation between pain and happiness across episodes in the PATS is 
–  0.10, while the corresponding correlation across moments in ESM data 
is –  0.20 for the sample of arthritis patients mentioned previously. These 
results suggest that the correlation between pairs of reported emotions in 
the PATS is a little weaker than the corresponding correlations in ESM and 
DRM, but they point in the same direction and are qualitatively similar.
With only three sampled episodes per interview, it is probably more diﬃ-
cult for respondents to reproduce their precise pattern of tiredness over the 
day. Still, the correspondence between the diurnal pattern of tiredness in 
PATS and DRM and ESM is reasonable (see ﬁ  g. 1.5). The pattern displayed 
by the PATS data is much less V-  shaped than was the case in the other sur-
veys, but the increasing pattern of tiredness in the afternoon and evening 
is clearly evident. The correlation between the average rating of tiredness 
each hour in PATS and DRM is 0.87, and between PATS and ESM is 0.86. 
Moreover, the PATS data show similar age interactions to what we found 
earlier; namely, a sharper decline in tiredness in the morning for younger 
respondents.
The correlation between reported life satisfaction and net aﬀect across 
people was also similar in PATS and the Texas DRM. In the (random sample 
component of the) Texas DRM, the correlation between life satisfaction and 
net aﬀect is 0.44 and in the PATS it is 0.35. Because net aﬀect can be com-
puted for only three episodes per person in the PATS, however, one would 
expect the 0.35 correlation to be biased downward. To make a fairer com-
parison, we randomly selected three episodes per person from the DRM. In 
this more comparable sample, the correlation fell to 0.39, quite close to the 
0.35 computed with PATS. Krueger and Schkade (2008) provide estimates 
of the reliability of life satisfaction and net aﬀect. Using their estimates to 
adjust for attenuation bias, the correlation between life satisfaction and net 
aﬀect would rise from 0.44 to around 0.70. This ﬁ  gure suggests that inter-
personal variations in average net aﬀect over many days reﬂ  ects about half 
of the variability in life satisfaction.
Table 1.3 considers how the average rating of happy compares across com-
mon activities in the PATS and the random sample of the Texas DRM, both 
on a zero to six scale.24 The Pearson correlation between the two measures is 
0.78, and the rank-  order correlation is 0.74. Childcare is the largest outlier, 
with a one- half point lower rating in the DRM. Television is another outlier, 
with the DRM exceeding the PATS.25 In these respects, the PATS ranking 
of activities are intermediate between the rankings in the Juster-  like survey 
and the DRM. It is possible that in the PATS, respondents reﬂ  ect more on 
the activity in general than the particular episode. Another possibility is that 
24. Attempts were made to make the activities as comparable as possible.
25. See Kubey and Csikszentmihalyi (1990) for a real-  time study of subjects’ emotional 
experiences while watching television.Table 1.3  Comparison of PATS and DRM average happiness rating (0–6) 
by activity
  Activity   PATS  DRM  Diﬀerence 
Housework 3.77 4.10 –0.33
Commuting 3.80 3.84 –0.04
Working 3.82 3.74 0.08
Watching TV 3.91 4.32 –0.41
Computer 4.06 3.94 0.12
Shopping 4.11 4.00 0.11
Preparing food 4.25 4.27 –0.02
On the phone 4.47 4.00 0.47
Relaxing 4.49 4.55 –0.06
Eating 4.57 4.43 0.14
Child care 4.59 4.06 0.53
Socializing 4.74 4.48 0.26
Prayer/worship 4.97 4.56 0.41
Exercising 5.09 4.77 0.32
  Unweighted average  4.37   4.23   0.15  
Notes: PATS sample is men and women combined. DRM sample is random component of 
Texas survey.
Fig. 1.5    Comparison of pattern of tiredness over the day based on PATS, DRM, 
and ESM samples
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diﬀerences in the sample populations between PATS and the DRM account 
for the discrepancies.
Table 1.4 summarizes results on how the order of emotions aﬀected 
reported intensity of feelings in PATS. As mentioned, we randomly assigned 
respondents to one of six diﬀerent orderings for the aﬀect questions. Once 
an order was selected, the same order was used for each of the three sampled 
ﬁ  fteen-  minute intervals. The order eﬀect for each of the emotions is statis-
tically signiﬁ  cant at the 0.025 level, and usually much lower. As a general 
rule, when positive emotions were asked about early on, their ratings tended 
to be higher, and when negative emotions were asked about early on, their 
ratings tended to be lower. If happy was asked ﬁ  rst, for example, its mean 
response was 4.35, compared with 3.99 when it was asked last; when pain 
was asked ﬁ  rst its mean response was 0.89, compared with 1.08 when it was 
asked last. Interestingly, the adjective “interested” behaved like a positive 
emotion in this regard. Table 1.2 combines results for the ﬁ  rst, second, and 
third episode that was inquired about. Surprisingly, when we disaggregated 
the order eﬀects were not notably stronger for the ﬁ  rst of the three episodes. 
We expected to ﬁ  nd stronger order eﬀects for the ﬁ  rst episode, as the order 
was known to respondents by the second and third episode. One interpreta-
tion of these results is that the ﬁ  rst emotion provides an anchor for the sub-
sequent ones. Respondents are typically in a positive mood before the aﬀect 
questions are asked (judging from the high frequency of positive aﬀect), and 
the response to the ﬁ  rst emotion question is anchored relative to this positive 
feeling. Because the order in which emotions were presented was randomly 
assigned to respondents in PATS, our results should not be biased by order 
eﬀects in any event.
Table 1.4  Average response by order of aﬀect questions in PATS sample
Average
    Happy  Tired  Stressed  Sad  Interested  Pain
Question order
 First 4.35 2.31 1.37 0.71 4.34 0.89
 Second 4.22 2.62 1.41 0.68 4.10 0.97
 Third 4.19 2.67 1.62 0.69 3.90 0.98
 Fourth 4.18 2.65 1.58 0.83 3.92 0.96
 Fifth 3.88 2.67 1.49 0.70 4.10 1.03
 Sixth 3.99 2.71 1.54 0.69 4.07 1.08
All   4.13   2.61   1.50   0.72  4.07   0.99
Notes: One of the following six diﬀerent orderings was randomly selected for each respondent. 
Order 1: Happy, Tired, Stressed, Sad, Interested, Pain; Order 2: Tired, Stressed, Sad, Inter-
ested, Pain, and Happy, Order 3: Stressed, Sad, Interested, Pain, Happy, and Tired; Order 4: 
Sad, Interested, Pain, Happy, Tired, and Stressed; Order 5: Interested, Pain, Happy, Tired, 
Stressed, and Sad; Order 6: Pain, Happy, Tired, Stressed, Sad, and Interested. Results are 
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It is also worth noting that the particular ordering used did not have a 
signiﬁ  cant eﬀect on the level of the U- index (p- value  0.37 for joint F- test 
of constant U-  index). Thus, a salutary feature of the U-  index is that it is 
apparently robust to order eﬀects, because the anchoring that produces the 
order eﬀects does not substantially alter the ordinal ranking of emotional 
ratings.
We can examine how the weather relates to the PATS aﬀect and satisfac-
tion data. Table 1.5 summarizes results from Connolly (2007), who merged 
daily weather data from the National Climate Data Center to the PATS 
survey. Speciﬁ  cally, she merged data on the mean temperature and amount 
of rainfall on the interview day and diary day (which is the day prior to the 
interview day), as well as the normal temperature and rainfall for the season 
and geographic area. Because temperature is highly correlated on adjacent 
days, it was not possible to estimate separate eﬀects of the temperature on 
the interview and diary day. Rainfall, however, varies considerably from 
day to day. Women’s reports of their life satisfaction and aﬀect were more 
sensitive to the weather than men’s, so we focus on results for women here. 
As in Schwarz and Clore’s (1983) survey, Connolly found that life satisfac-
tion was lower in the PATS if women were interviewed on rainy days. Life 
satisfaction was also lower in areas with higher normal precipitation levels 
and temperature. Temperature on the interview day was unrelated to life 
satisfaction, but a higher temperature on the diary day was associated with 
lower net aﬀect. Since PATS was conducted in the late spring and summer, 
one might expect hotter days to be associated with lower net aﬀect. Rain 
on the interview day was insigniﬁ  cantly related to net aﬀect, while a small 
amount of rain on the diary day was associated with lower net aﬀect. These 
Table 1.5  Summary of eﬀects of weather on reported well-  being in the PATS survey
  Variable   Life satisfaction  Net aﬀect 
Normal rainfall — 0
Rain on interview day — 0
Rain on diary day 0 –/0
Normal temperature  0
Temperature on interview day 0 n.a.
  Temperature on diary day   n.a.   —  
Notes: Connolly entered dummy variables for ranges of the rain and temperature variables in 
her regression analysis. A negative sign here indicates a negative and statistically signiﬁ  cant 
eﬀect of the climate measure, a positive sign indicates a positive and statistically signiﬁ  cant 
eﬀect of the climate measure, and n.a. indicates that the measure was not included in the 
particular analysis because of multicolinearity. Sample consists of women from PATS. The 
satisfaction regression also controlled for demographic variables (education, age, marital sta-
tus, race, and ethnicity). The net aﬀect regression also controlled for activity dummies, month, 
day, state, and demographic variables. See tables 3.4, 3.12, and 3.16 of Connolly (2007) for the 
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results suggest that the weather inﬂ  uences reported net aﬀect in the PATS 
data in a plausible way that is consistent with the true eﬀect of the weather 
on people’s moods, while the weather on the interview day is unrelated to 
net aﬀect reported for the preceding day, as one would hope.
Finally, Alan Krueger and Arthur Stone have conducted a small scale 
study of 168 workers in Syracuse, NY and Stony Brook, NY who partici-
pated in a specially designed ESM study on three consecutive days in the 
spring and summer of 2008 (on a Thursday, Friday, and Saturday). A day 
later, participants also completed the PATS questionnaire referring to the 
same days covered by the ESM survey. In the ESM component of the survey, 
respondents were asked about their feelings on six occasions on each day, 
after being prompted by a PDA. The PATS component asked about emo-
tions during three randomly selected ﬁ  fteen-  minute intervals. Because it 
proved impossible to conduct the study on a representative sample, subjects 
were recruited through advertising and were oﬀered $120 for their participa-
tion. But because we compare reported emotions from the two survey modes 
for the same individuals, any systematic diﬀerences are likely to be due to 
the survey methods. To avoid confusion, we call the PATS component of 
this survey PATS- 2. The PATS-  2 interviewing was also conducted by Gal-
lup. The emotions inquired about in the PATS-  2 and ESM questionnaires 
included those in the original PATS (happy, sad, stressed, pain, etc.). We 
use these data to compare the real-  time responses of respondents to their 
recalled experiences in the PATS-  2 instrument.
Figure 1.6 reports the average rating of the emotions from the two surveys. 
The negative emotions received a slightly higher rating in the ESM than in 
the PATS-  2 survey, which may partly reﬂ  ect their order on the ESM ques-
tionnaire (in the PATS- 2 the order was randomly assigned). The diﬀerences 
Fig. 1.6    Average of subjects’ ratings in ESM and PATS-  2 for same sample members
Notes: Order of emotions was randomized in PATS-  2. Sample is 165 individuals who re-
sponded in both surveys. Except for happy, all diﬀerences are signiﬁ  cant at 0.005 level in 
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are qualitatively small, however, even though they are usually statistically 
signiﬁ  cant. Clearly, the pattern of intensity across emotions is the same 
regardless of whether the emotions were recalled or collected in real time.
For the 105 moments in time that were sampled in both the ESM and 
PATS-  2 surveys (those that by chance happen to have overlapped), we can 
calculate the correlation between the emotions from the two surveys. The 
correlations ranged from 0.41 for happiness to 0.54 for pain. The correlation 
of the U-  index measured in overlapping moments was 0.54. These correla-
tions are lower than one might hope, but still nontrivial. Moreover, they 
could be biased slightly downward because the PATS refers to a ﬁ  fteen-
  minute slice while the ESM data are for a moment in time.
A larger sample can be used to compare the ratings of activities because 
it is not necessary to restrict the sample to overlapping moments. Table 1.6 
reports the U-  index during various activities for the two survey modes. We 
restrict the sample to activities with at least forty-  ﬁ  ve sampled episodes 
in PATS-  2 to reduce sampling error. In both survey modes the U-  index 
is low for social activities and eating, and high for work and travel time. 
The correlation of the measures across the activities is 0.83, and the rank 
correlation is 0.86. Given the sampling variability inherent in the activity-
  level U-  indices, it is also noteworthy that if we weight the activities by the 
PATS-  2 sample size (which ranges from forty-  ﬁ  ve to 423), the correlation 
rises to 0.90. Finally, we note that we used the ESM-  PATS-2 data to com-
pute the correlation of person-  level averages. That is, for each individual 
we computed the average of the (up to eighteen) ESM ratings and of the 
(up to nine) PATS- 2 ratings of each emotion, and computed the correlation 
between them. The correlation ranged from 0.75 for happiness to 0.86 for 
pain. These correlations are attenuated by sampling variability, however, as 
we only sampled a small number of random moments from each person’s 
day. If the correlation is adjusted for sampling variability, it rises to 0.92 for 
happiness and 0.94 for pain.
Table 1.6  Average U-  Index during popular activities, as measured by ESM and 
PATS-  2 for the same sample








  All activities   0.126  0.112  
Notes: U-  index equals one if rating of stress, sad, or pain exceeds happiness. Activities are 
based on PATS-  2 questionnaire.44        A. B. Krueger, D. Kahneman, D. Schkade, N. Schwarz, and A. A. Stone
We conclude that the PATS instrument and real-  time reporting do a rea-
sonably similar job characterizing individuals or activities. They are less con-
sistent in describing feelings at speciﬁ  c moments, although the measures are 
still positively correlated and the mean reported emotion over all moments 
is remarkably similar regardless of whether it is reported in real-  time or 
recalled a day later.
1.5      Well-  Being across Groups and Activities
1.5.1    Diﬀerences in Well-  Being between Groups
We use the PATS to compare aﬀective experience across groups of indi-
viduals and frequent uses of time. Table 1.7 reports the average U-  index 
for several demographic groups, and some of those results are highlighted 
here. (Table 1A.1 presents results of the eﬀect of demographic and other 
variables on the U-  index in a multiple regression framework.) The U-  index 
is 2 points lower for men than women ( p- value   0.10). The U-  index is 
higher for blacks and hispanics than for whites. The U-  index falls with 
household income and education. Those in households with income below 
$30,000 per year spend almost 50 percent more time in an unpleasant state 
than do people with income above $100,000 per year (22.5 percent versus 
15.7 percent). The data indicate a mild inverse U-  shape pattern in unpleas-
ant moments with age for women. These patterns are often found in life 
satisfaction data and in our earlier DRM studies.
Married men and women have the same U-  index, 17.4 percent. The 
U-  index for never married men and cohabiting men is also around 17 per-
cent. The U-  index is notably higher for unmarried women and divorced 
men. The former result is a contrast to our previous DRM studies, which 
found that married and unmarried women exhibited a similar U-  index. 
Interestingly, the U-  index is around 23 percent for all groups of unmarried 
women, divorced, widowed, cohabiting, and never married. In a regres-
sion, the married-  unmarried gap is not accounted for by controlling for 
demographic variables or activities. Controlling for diﬀerences in household 
income, however, accounts for more than half of the marriage gap in the 
U-  index for women.
1.5.2    Activities
Table 1.8 reports the U- index and mean of ﬁ  ve reported emotions during 
various primary activities. The order of activities is ranked by the U-  index. 
The U-  index is relatively low during discretionary activities, including 
religion/  prayer, sports and exercise, relaxing and leisure, and socializing. 
Watching television is rated in the middle of the activities shown, as are food 
preparation and volunteering. The highest U- index activities include house-
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cation, and caring for adults. This pattern is quite plausible, although it 
deviates in some important respects from the Juster-  like general activity 
results.
Some of the ratings of the speciﬁ  c emotions are also worth discussing. The 
intensity of both pain and happiness are high during episodes of sports and 
exercise, especially for men. This pattern, which is not surprising, may result 
from elevated endorphins during exercise. The low rating of “interested” 
during education-  related activities might be related to the high dropout 
rate of college-  age students in the United States. Telephone calls seem to 
evoke a high level of diverse emotions, with above- average ratings of happy, 
stressed, sad, and interest. Medical care is rated as an especially painful 
Table 1.7  U-  Index for various demographic groups, PATS data









   $30,000 22.5
 $30,000–$50,000 18.6
 $50,000–$100,000 18.6
   $100,000 15.7
Education
   High school 20.5
 High  school 21.3
 Some  college 19.6
 College 15.6
 Master’s 16.6
 Doctorate 11.3 
Men (%)  Women (%)
Age
 15–24 18.8 18.9
 25–44 17.1 20.5
 45–64 18.7 20.9
 65 15.6 16.1
Marital Status
 Married 17.4 17.4
 Divorced/separated 24.3 24.5
 Widowed 20.2 22.3
 Never  married 16.9 23.2
   Cohabiting   17.3   23.3  
Notes: U-  index is proportion of time that rating of sad, stressed, or pain exceeds happy.46        A. B. Krueger, D. Kahneman, D. Schkade, N. Schwarz, and A. A. Stone
activity, particularly by women. The emotional experience of watching tele-
vision appears quite close to the overall average emotional experience during 
the day, except for stress, which is below average.
A salutary feature of the PATS is that the same individual reports on 
multiple episodes of the day. As a result, individual ﬁ  xed-  eﬀects (means) 
can be removed when studying diﬀerences in activities. Table 1.9 reports the 
U-  index and aﬀective ratings during the various activities after removing 
individual ﬁ  xed eﬀects. In essence, this analysis compares the emotional rat-
ings of the same individual as he or she moves from one activity to another. 
In general, the activities are ranked similarly with or without ﬁ  xed eﬀects 
removed. The correlation between the U-  index across activities in Table 
1.8 and 1.9 is 0.93. The biggest movement occurs for medical care and 
personal care, both of which become less unpleasant when person-  eﬀects 
are removed, indicating that the people who tend to engage in these activi-
ties have a higher-  than-  average U-  index during other episodes of the day. 
Because people tend to seek medical care when they are in pain or ill, this 
ﬁ  nding is quite plausible.
Table 1.8  U-  Index and average of selected emotions by activity
ATUS activity category  
U- index 
(%)   Happy  Stressed  Sad  Interested  Pain 
No. of 
episodes
Religious 6.4 4.97 0.90 0.66 5.09 0.61 151
Sports and exercise 7.4 5.08 0.84 0.25 4.92 1.20 321
Eating and drinking 9.7 4.57 1.11 0.52 4.03 0.80 1,206
Relaxing and Leisure 13.4 4.34 1.08 0.70 4.55 0.91 1,173
Socializing 13.5 4.74 1.21 0.66 4.65 0.88 528
Lawn and garden 14.2 4.23 0.98 0.47 3.92 1.37 318
Child care 15.6 4.63 1.76 0.39 4.41 0.56 376
Shopping 16.9 4.11 1.42 0.45 4.04 0.85 342
Volunteer 17.7 4.22 1.40 0.61 4.86 0.57 53
Watching TV 18.1 3.91 1.17 0.82 3.97 0.94 1,946
Food prep and clean-  up 19.0 4.02 1.58 0.62 3.62 1.07 595
Travel 20.7 4.05 1.69 0.59 3.46 0.81 1,150
Telephone calls 23.5 4.47 2.02 1.14 4.99 0.86 128
Personal care 23.6 4.02 1.83 0.91 3.32 1.30 172
Housework 24.0 3.55 1.46 0.61 3.16 1.02 538
Working 26.9 3.80 2.37 0.69 3.99 0.71 1,671
Household management 27.9 3.50 1.85 0.82 3.94 0.76 235
Medical care 29.0 3.64 2.50 0.75 4.06 1.66 77
Education 32.3 3.62 2.66 0.87 3.87 0.82 143
Adult care 33.8 3.54 1.89 1.46 3.63 1.34 67
All   18.6   4.13   1.53   0.66  4.03   0.88  11,781
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PATS.
Notes: U-  index indicates the proportion of ﬁ  fteen-  minute intervals in which stressed, sad, or pain ex-
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Another feature of the PATS is that aﬀect can be modeled before, during, 
and after participating in a speciﬁ  c activity. Figure 1.7 illustrates this point by 
showing the average rating of the emotion “happy” in relation to the occur-
rence of an episode involving sports or exercise. Speciﬁ  cally, we regressed 
the happiness rating on the number of minutes before or after an episode 
involving exercise with an interaction to allow for a diﬀerent slope before 
and after exercise, for the subset of people who exercised on the interview 
day. The model was estimated both with and without person ﬁ  xed eﬀects. 
Time zero corresponds to the period of exercise. Especially in the model that 
removes person ﬁ  xed eﬀects, an inverse- V pattern is evident: Happiness rises 
as a period of exercise approaches and then decays afterwards. With more 
observations, a less constraining model could be estimated.
Krueger and Mueller (2008) use the PATS data to compare the well-
 being of employed and unemployed individuals. Many previous studies have 
found that the unemployed are much less satisﬁ  ed with their lives (e.g., Clark 
and Oswald 1994). The PATS data likewise show signiﬁ  cantly lower average 
Table 1.9  U-  index and average of selected emotions by activity after removing individual 
ﬁ  xed eﬀects
ATUS activity category  
U- index 
(%)   Happy   Stressed   Sad   Interested   Pain  
No. of 
episodes
Religious 8.3 4.81 0.94 0.83 5.14 0.88 151
Eating and drinking 10.7 4.49 1.14 0.55 3.99 0.78 1,206
Sports and exercise 11.9 4.89 1.22 0.48 4.87 1.48 321
Socializing 13.0 4.68 1.21 0.59 4.65 0.84 528
Child care 13.6 4.59 1.44 0.49 4.49 0.65 376
Relaxing and leisure 15.1 4.35 1.24 0.68 4.49 0.88 1,173
Watching TV 15.7 4.00 1.16 0.71 4.01 0.77 1,946
Lawn and garden 16.7 4.21 1.21 0.55 3.92 1.25 318
Personal care 17.4 4.07 1.47 0.60 3.20 0.96 172
Food prep and clean-  up 17.6 4.02 1.42 0.51 3.39 0.92 595
Shopping 18.0 4.15 1.68 0.63 4.01 0.92 342
Travel 19.8 4.06 1.62 0.63 3.64 0.89 1,150
Telephone calls 20.4 4.50 1.73 0.94 5.14 0.84 128
Volunteering 20.7 4.28 1.72 0.81 4.71 0.96 53
Medical care 22.6 3.76 2.20 0.83 4.52 1.22 77
Housework 25.6 3.56 1.57 0.68 3.11 1.08 538
Household management 27.4 3.70 1.68 0.78 4.00 0.76 235
Education 28.7 3.55 2.39 0.90 4.09 0.80 143
Working 28.8 3.83 2.34 0.78 4.09 0.89 1,671
Adult care 32.0 3.50 1.79 1.15 3.37 1.23 67
All   18.6   4.13   1.53   0.66  4.03   0.89  11,781
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PATS.
Notes: U-  index indicates the proportion of ﬁ  fteen-  minute intervals in which stressed, sad, or pain ex-
ceeded happy.48        A. B. Krueger, D. Kahneman, D. Schkade, N. Schwarz, and A. A. Stone
life satisfaction and a signiﬁ  cantly higher U- index for the unemployed than 
employed. The PATS data enable one to further ask: during which activi-
ties are the unemployed particularly unhappy or sad? The results indicate 
that the unemployed are particularly sad during time periods involving job 
searching and television viewing.
1.5.3    Interaction  Partners
The presence of others during an episode aﬀects the pleasantness of the 
experience. Table 1.10 presents the U-  index for men and women, disaggre-
gated by who else was present during the episode. The tabulations do not 
control for other features of the episode, but the pattern is generally similar 
when we control for the activity engaged in during the episode as well as 
person ﬁ  xed eﬀects. For simplicity, we present the unadjusted results here.
When people are alone, the U- index is higher than when they interact with 
others. The identity of the “others” matters, however. For men, the U- index 
is lower when friends and relatives are present. Spending time with cowork-
ers is associated with a higher U-  index for both men and women, primarily 
because work has a high incidence of negative emotions, particularly stress. 
Spending time with the boss makes the experience of work notably more 
unpleasant. The pattern for men and women is similar, except for the strik-
ing elevation in the U-  index for women when it comes to spending time 
Fig. 1.7    Happiness rating before and after exercise, results of a linear splineNational Time Accounting: The Currency of Life    4 9
with one’s parents or children.26 These diﬀerences are partly explained by 
the diﬀerent mix of activities that men and women engage in when they are 
with their parents and children. For example, men spend relatively more 
of their time with children watching television and traveling than do women, 
while women spend relatively more of their time with children engaged in 
child care and doing chores. Even holding activities constant, however, there 
are sizable diﬀerences in the U-  index between men and women when they 
are in the company of their parents or children.
1.5.4    Day  of  Week
Table 1.11 reports the U-  index by day of the week (i.e., the diary day). 
A test of a constant U-  index across days is rejected at the 0.01 level. Not 
surprisingly, weekend days are associated with less unpleasant feelings than 
weekdays, although the U-  index is slightly lower on Fridays than on Sat-
urdays. (For many people, apparently the weekend starts on Friday.) The 
U- index is lowest on Sundays and slightly higher on Mondays than on Tues-
days through Thursdays. Almost half of the weekend-  weekday diﬀerence 
in the U-  index can be accounted for by the diﬀerent mix of activities that 
take place on the weekend. The empirical support for the song “rainy days 
and Mondays always get me down” thus far is limited, as a statistical test 
does not ﬁ  nd the U-  index on Monday to be signiﬁ  cantly higher than on 
other weekdays (t  1.41), and the evidence on rain on the diary day cited 
in table 1.5 was mixed as well.27
1.5.5      Goods and Time Use
In the standard economic model, people consume goods to increase 
their utility. Time-  use data are notably lacking in information on goods 
26. The ranking in Table 1.9 for women is exactly the same as was found for interaction 
partners in the Texas DRM, except parents were not separately identiﬁ  ed in the DRM.
27. Stone et al. (1985) provide related evidence.
Table 1.10  U-  Index by whom with based on PATS data
    Men (%)  Women (%) 
p-  value for diﬀerence 
between men and women
Alone 18.3 21.9 0.033
Spouse 15.8 15.3 0.808
Children 10.2 17.7 0.034
Parents 7.2 27.1 0.025
Friends 11.8 12.8 0.792
Coworkers 25.9 27.5 0.615
Boss/supervisor  46.9   30.5   0.52250        A. B. Krueger, D. Kahneman, D. Schkade, N. Schwarz, and A. A. Stone
consumption. Instead, it can be hoped that the activity description reﬂ  ects 
the goods consumed during an episode or that no goods are involved. In 
many situations, however, this is likely to be inadequate. For example, food 
must be involved during episodes of eating, but we lack information on the 
quantity or quality of food. Dinners at McDonalds’ or the French Laun-
dry are   obviously not equivalent experiences, yet these events are lumped 
together in the time-  use data. When computed at the episode level, the 
U-  index potentially reﬂ  ects features of the episode, such as consumption 
of goods, that are not captured elsewhere in the data. Unobserved features 
of activities, including goods consumption, surely account for some of the 
variability in emotional responses across respondents engaged in a given 
activity.
The largest expenditure item for most people is their housing. Wong 
(2007) merged data on housing values and other housing characteristics 
to the Columbus DRM to explore the eﬀect of housing consumption on 
subjective well-  being. She ﬁ  nds that respondents who live in larger or more 
expensive homes do not report higher net aﬀect while they are at home 
(either absolutely or in comparison to time spent away from home). This 
conclusion holds for both women with and without children living at home. 
She also ﬁ  nds that reported joy from one’s house and home is unrelated to 
the market value of the home but is positively related to the market value 
of the homes in the neighborhood.
To illustrate the eﬀect of the consumption of goods on the aﬀective expe-
rience of time use, in the PATS we collected information on the size of the 
television set being viewed during episodes of watching television. Because 
television absorbs such a large proportion of people’s time, this seemed a 
particularly worthwhile activity to focus on. Speciﬁ  cally, we asked respon-
dents whether the television screen they were watching was greater than or 
smaller than twenty-  ﬁ  ve inches. (If we were to redo the survey today, we 
might ask about ﬂ  at screen versus not-  ﬂ  at screen.) We regressed each of 
the reported emotions during television watching on an indicator for the 
size of the television set, education, household income, and the mean aﬀect 
rating during other episodes of the day. The results indicated some emo-
Table 1.11  U-  Index by day of week based on PATS data
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tional beneﬁ  t from watching a larger television: stress was lower (t  –  2.7) 
and net aﬀect was higher (t  2.0) if a larger television was being watched. 
Although we would not make too much out of this result, it does suggest the 
utility of collecting information on the nature of the goods involved during 
participation in certain activities.
Clearly more could be done in connecting goods to the quality of expe-
riences. For example, the nature of kitchen equipment could be related to 
aﬀect during episodes involving cooking, and the make and model of cars 
could be related to aﬀect during episodes of travel. Note, however, that 
goods only aﬀect people’s hedonic experience when they attend to them. For 
example, Schwarz, Kahneman, and Xu (2009) explored how the quality of 
the car driven (as indexed by the car’s Bluebook value) aﬀects the driver’s 
emotional experience. They found that drivers feel better driving luxury cars 
than economy cars—but only during episodes that are car-  focused; that 
is, in the 2 percent of episodes that the drivers categorized as “driving for 
fun.” In the other 98 percent of driving episodes, like commuting to work 
or shopping, the type of car driven was unrelated to drivers’ emotional 
experiences. In short, the car only made a diﬀerence when the car was on 
the driver’s mind. However, drivers are not aware of this contingency and 
drivers of luxury cars reported that they “generally” feel much better while 
driving than drivers of economy cars. Such discrepancies between global 
and episodic reports of enjoyment highlight that global reports of one’s 
“usual” experience are based on general beliefs about the type of activ-
ity, which are often at odds with actual experience as captured by episodic 
assessments.
1.5.6    Decomposing  Group  Diﬀerences: The Case of Age and Income
Age
Past research ﬁ  nds that older individuals report fewer negative emotional 
experiences and greater emotional control than younger individuals (e.g., 
Gross et al. 1997). Consistent with this result, we ﬁ  nd that the U-  index is 
lower for those age sixty- ﬁ  ve and older than for the younger population. The 
younger group works more and spends more time taking care of children, 
activities associated with stress (see ﬁ  g. 1.8). How much of the diﬀerence in 
the U-  index between young and old is accounted for by diﬀerences in their 
activities? Here we provide an example of how the diﬀerence in well-  being 
between groups can be attributed to diﬀerences in time allocated across 
activities and diﬀerences in aﬀect derived from a given set of situations and 
a residual.
To simplify the analysis, we focus on the gap in the U-  index between 
people age twenty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four and those sixty-  ﬁ  ve and over. We also 
conﬁ  ne our attention to weekdays, when diﬀerences in activities are more 
pronounced. Table 1.12 summarizes our results. The U- index is 20.4 percent 52        A. B. Krueger, D. Kahneman, D. Schkade, N. Schwarz, and A. A. Stone
for the younger group and 16.1 percent for the older group, a gap of 4.3 
points (p  0.007). If we compute the U-  index using each group’s actual 
time allocation and the average activity ratings for the combined sample (so 
the entire diﬀerence is due to diﬀerences in time allocated across activities), 
the gap is predicted to be 2.5 points.28 Thus, 58 percent ( 100  2.5/  4.3) 
of the diﬀerence in the U-  index between young and working-  age is solely a 
result of diﬀerences in their activities. The remaining 1.8 point gap is a result 
of diﬀerences in emotional responses to the same set of activities or an inter-
action between diﬀerences in ratings and diﬀerences in time allocation.
Table 1.12  Decomposition of U-  index for 25 to 64-  year-  olds and those 65 and over
Group   Actual (%)   Predicted (%)  
Unexplained by 
activities (%)
25–64- year- olds 20.4 20.0 0.4
65 16.1 17.5 –1.4
Diﬀerence   4.3   2.5   1.8
Notes: Table gives actual episode-  level U-  index and the predicted U-  index using the overall 
sample’s average U-  index at the activity-  level. Seventy-  two harmonized activities are used.
28. This is mostly a result of the diﬀerence in working hours. During weekdays the younger 
group spent 24 percent of its awake time at work compared with just 2.6 percent for the 
older group. The U-  index is 9 points higher during work-  related episodes. So 9 percent  
(.24– .026)   1.9 points of the 2.5 points is due to the diﬀerence in time spent at work.
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A further indication that choice of activity plays a role here comes from 
comparing the weekend and weekdays. On the weekend, the U-  index falls 
to 16.8 percent for the younger group, not very diﬀerent from the U-  index 
for the older group during the week.29
Income
Unlike the gap in U- index between older and younger groups, diﬀerences 
in time use across activities do not help explain the diﬀerence in U-  index 
between income groups. To illustrate, we divided the sample of people age 
twenty- ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four into two groups, those in families with annual 
income less than $40,000 and those in families with annual income of 
$75,000 or more. Table 1.13 summarizes our results.
The U-  index is 23.2 percent for the lower income group and 19.0 per-
cent for the higher income group, a gap of 4.2 points. If we recompute the 
U-  index using each group’s actual time allocation and the average activity 
ratings for the combined sample (so the entire diﬀerence is due to diﬀerences 
in time allocated across activities), the gap is predicted to be –  1 point. That 
is, the lower income group spends slightly more time in activities that are 
rated lower on the U- index. So the higher income group has a comparatively 
lower U-  index because it rates the same activities as more enjoyable than 
does the lower income group. Episodes of TV watching, for example, have 
a lower U-  index for the higher income group.
One reason why diﬀerences in activities might explain a large share of the 
age gap in the U-  index but not of the income-  gap involves reverse causal-
ity. High- income earners may earn high incomes, in part, because they have 
cheerful personalities that enable them to prosper in the job market. Those 
who tend to be depressed and unhappy, on the other hand, are likely to 
suﬀer an income loss as a result. Causality runs, at least in part, from per-
sonality trait to income. Diﬀerences in personalities between income groups 
are likely to permeate their feelings throughout the day, regardless of the 
Table 1.13  Decomposition of U-  index by income group
Group   Actual (%)  Predicted (%) 
Unexplained by 
activities (%)
 40,000 23.2 20.4 2.8
 $75,000 19.0 21.4 –2.4
Diﬀerence  4.2   –1.0   5.2
Notes: Table gives actual episode-  level U-  index and the predicted U-  index using the overall 
sample’s average U-  index at the activity-  level. Seventy-  two harmonized activities are used.
29. The U-  index also falls for the older group, but by a smaller amount, to 13.4 percent. 
Perhaps the elderly are more cheerful on the weekend because they interact with more cheerful 
younger people on those days.54        A. B. Krueger, D. Kahneman, D. Schkade, N. Schwarz, and A. A. Stone
activities individuals engage in. In contrast to income groups, personality 
diﬀerences between age groups are likely to be less important because age is 
exogenously determined.
1.6    Identifying  Aﬀectively Similar Activities
Summarizing time-  use data at the activity level can be unwieldy.30 The 
ATUS, for example, has hundreds of detailed activity codes. To make the 
analysis tractable, it is necessary to group activities into common categories. 
But classifying activities requires judgments of what activities are similar. 
Should gardening and lawn care be classiﬁ  ed with leisure activities or with 
home production activities, for example? Researchers may have a diﬀerent 
view of the enjoyment derived from such activities than the general public 
would. (See Aguiar and Hurst [2007] and Ramey and Francis [2006] for 
alternative results in which researchers classiﬁ  ed time use into broad catego-
ries, such as leisure, home production, and market work. For results of an 
alternative approach that classiﬁ  es leisure based on individuals’ interactions 
with others, see Nadal and Sanz [2007]).
Rather than externally assign activities to groups, we propose an alterna-
tive approach: use the average of the emotional ratings that respondents 
reported during each activity to assign activities with similar emotional 
experiences to the same group. Speciﬁ  cally, we use K-  means cluster anal-
ysis to identify K groups of activities associated with similar emotional 
experiences. Cluster analysis is a family of techniques for assigning observa-
tions to groups (clusters) in a way that minimizes the discrepancies within 
groups and maximizes discrepancies between groups. For a single outcome 
measure (e.g., happy), the K- means cluster technique minimizes the within-
  cluster variance, which also has the feature of maximizing the between-
 cluster variance in means. The interpretation is more complicated with more 
than one outcome measure, but the intuition is the same. The algorithm for 
the Stata cluster procedure used here minimizes the sum of squared Euclid-
ean distances of the emotions associated with the activities from their cluster 
means (which is equivalent to maximizing between group diﬀerences as well 
due to a multivariate extension of the Pythagorean identity from analysis 
of variance [ANOVA]).
We illustrate this approach using ratings of pain, happy, tired, stressed, 
sad, and interested to cluster activities. Activities form the unit of observa-
tion. For each activity, we computed the weighted average of each of those 
six emotional responses. Activities in the PATS were originally coded with 
the same system that the Census Bureau uses for ATUS. Because we will 
use the groups to make historical comparisons in section 1.7, we converted 
the ATUS activity codes to seventy-  two “harmonized” codes used in the 
30. This section and the next one borrow heavily from Krueger (2007).National Time Accounting: The Currency of Life    5 5
American Heritage Time Use Studies (AHTUS).31 These harmonized codes 
are activity codes that can be compared over time in a consistent way. We 
set K to equal 6, mainly because 6 is a tractable number of categories and 
because it is not very diﬀerent from the number of categories that research-
ers have used in the past. It would be possible to explore the sensitivity of 
the results to other values of K, or to select K on the basis of a goodness 
of ﬁ  t test.
Two additional features of the analysis are worth noting. First, the activi-
ties were weighted by their relative frequencies.32 Thus, the resulting clusters 
can be thought of as minimizing the weighted sum of within-  group vari-
ances. Second, because cluster analysis is an iterative procedure that can be 
sensitive to the starting point, we executed the cluster command thirty-  ﬁ  ve 
times using random starting points and selected the estimates with the high-
est Calinski and Harabasz pseudo-  F statistic, deﬁ  ned as:
F  
trace(B)/ (g 	 1)

trace(W)/ (n 	 g),
where B is the between-  cluster sum of squares and cross-  products matrix, 
W is the within-  cluster sum of squares and cross-  products matrix, g is the 
number of groups, and n is the sample size.
Table 1.14 reports the optimal cluster assignments for the most common 
activities and the average ratings for each of the six emotions. In addition, 
the table reports net aﬀect, the positive emotion (happy) less the average 
of the negative ones (sad, pain, stressed). Many of the cluster assignments 
make intuitive sense. Paid work performed at home and away from home, for 
example, are both in cluster 6, as is helping someone with homework. Home 
production activities, including cleaning and putting away dishes, are mostly 
assigned together in cluster 5. There are some unexpected results, however. 
For example, time on a second job is classiﬁ  ed in cluster 2 while other paid 
work is in cluster 6. Unfortunately, we did not collect occupation or industry 
for secondary jobs. Compared with surveyed episodes during the main job, 
people on a second job were much less likely to work with coworkers and 
were more likely to work alone or with their spouse.
In addition to tracking and organizing time use, another application of 
the classiﬁ  cation of activities that result from this exercise would be for non-
market NIPAs. In particular, a question often arises in valuing nonmarket 
31. The concordance was from the Center for Time Use Research (www.timeuse.org/
  athus/  documentation). The concordance contains ninety-  two activities, fourteen of which 
could not be coded in the ATUS. We combined child care regardless of the child’s age. We 
omitted sleeping and napping and a small number of infrequent activities that were not covered 
by PATS, resulting in seventy-  two harmonized activities.
32. Because Stata does not have a weight option with cluster, we created a new data set 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































558        A. B. Krueger, D. Kahneman, D. Schkade, N. Schwarz, and A. A. Stone
activities whether an activity should be valued at the wage rate, at the market 
wage for hiring someone to perform a task, or at some other price. Another 
issue concerns whether particular activities such as schooling are primarily 
consumption activities or investment activities. One answer to this question 
is that activities that are as stressful and uninteresting as someone’s main 
job should be valued at the same wage as the main job. Likewise, activities 
that are as enjoyable as socializing should be treated as leisure. The cluster 
analysis provides a means for identifying activities that are associated with 
similar emotional experiences. For example, time spent in school does not 
appear to be a consumption activity in our data, and time spent taking care 
of teenagers appears as taxing as one’s main job.
Table 1.15 reports the mean of the emotions and net aﬀect for each cluster 
of activities. The lowest rated cluster in terms of net aﬀect is cluster 1, which 
includes receiving medical care, purchasing medical services, seeking govern-
ment services, and doing homework. Cluster 2 involves tasks like writing 
and using a computer. The most enjoyable and interesting activities are in 
cluster 3, including religious activities, exercise, attending parties, listening 
to music, playing with children, and recreation. Cluster 4 is a mixture of 
activities, such as watching television, relaxing, cooking, and gardening, 
that are close to average in terms of aﬀect ratings. Cluster 5, which includes 
domestic activities such as doing laundry, ironing, caring for adults, and 
cleaning, is slightly above cluster 6 (work) in terms of net aﬀect but well 
below it in terms of interest.
If we were to assign value-  laden terms to describe the clusters, we could 
think of cluster 1 as unpleasant personal maintenance, cluster 2 as moder-
ately enjoyable tasks, cluster 3 as engaging leisure and spiritual activities, 
cluster 4 as neutral downtime and cooking, cluster 5 as mundane chores, 
and cluster 6 as work-  like activities.
One caveat to bear in mind is that average aﬀect ratings are conditional 
on engaging in the activity for a given length of time. People probably sort 
into the activities that they engage in based, in part, on how much utility 
Table 1.15  Average of emotions by cluster
Cluster  Happy  Tired  Stressed  Sad   Interested  Pain  Net eﬀect
1 3.09 2.97 2.92 1.18 3.57 1.80 1.12
2 4.29 2.31 1.18 0.55 4.06 0.78 3.45
3 4.79 2.37 1.05 0.56 4.79 0.84 3.97
4 4.05 2.87 1.23 0.76 3.95 1.06 3.04
5 3.86 2.72 1.64 0.63 3.44 0.89 2.80
6   3.88   2.83   2.35   0.69  4.04   0.69  2.63
Notes: Averages are weighted by episode frequency and sample weights. All emotions are re-
ported on a 0 to 6 scale. Sample is PATS data. Based on July 5, 2007, cluster6_freqwgt_ctus_
best.log.National Time Accounting: The Currency of Life    5 9
they derive from them. If the cluster analysis is redone using residuals of the 
six emotions after removing person eﬀects, however, 83 percent of activities 
(weighted by frequency) remain in the same cluster as in the original assign-
ment that did not remove person eﬀects. Thus, the cluster analysis seems to 
provide a reasonably robust and plausible set of groups of activities that can 
be used to compare time use over time or between countries.
1.7      Comparing Time Use over Time in Groups of Activities and Generally
We propose three techniques for tracking time use over time: (a) following 
groups of activities deﬁ  ned in section 1.6, (b) computing an overall U- index 
based on the U-  index associated with various activities at a point in time; 
and (c) computing the U-  index at the episode level. To illustrate the ﬁ  rst 
two techniques, we used data from a project originally of the Yale Univer-
sity Program on Nonmarket Accounts, known as the American Heritage 
Time Use Studies (AHTUS). The AHTUS consists of ﬁ  ve time-  use sur-
veys conducted from 1965 and 1966 through 2003. The disparate activity 
codes were harmonized to a common set of seventy-  two main activities 
(plus missing/ unclassiﬁ  ed). In addition, we merged the harmonized activity 
codes to the 2005 ATUS and include it as well. The underlying sources of 
the harmonized data are described in the following box. Unfortunately, it is 
not possible to compute the episode-  level U-  index over time as PATS-  like 
data are not available in earlier years, so we just illustrate the technique. We 
hope that data will be available in the future for episode-  level analyses.
Historical Time-  Use Surveys
￿   1965–  1966: Original source is Multinational Comparative Time- 
Budget Research Project conducted by the University of Michi-
gan’s Survey Research Center. N  1,968.
￿    1975–  1976: Original source is American’s Use of Time: Time Use 
in Economic and Social Accounts, conducted by the University of 
Michigan’s Survey Research Center. N  5,869.
￿    1985: Original source is American’s Use of Time, conducted by the 
University of Maryland’s Survey Research Center. N  2,308.
￿   1992–  1994: Original source is National Human Activity Pattern 
Survey, conducted by the University of Maryland’s Survey Re-
search Center. N  5,964.
￿   2003: Original source is ATUS, conducted by Census Bureau for 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. N  15,999.
￿   2005: Original source is ATUS, conducted by Census Bureau for 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. N  10,112.60        A. B. Krueger, D. Kahneman, D. Schkade, N. Schwarz, and A. A. Stone
Sample weights were used for all estimates using the AHTUS data sets. 
Because we lack aﬀect ratings during sleep, we focus on the waking day.33 
One issue that we can only partially address is that the data sets use diﬀerent 
methods and sampling frames. For example, the 1965 to 1966 survey sam-
pled people from households in which someone was employed in a nonagri-
cultural industry, and only covered certain months of the year. The samples 
were restricted to those from age nineteen to sixty-  four to have a consistent 
age range. The average age was fairly similar in the data sets, ranging from 
38.4 in 1985 to 40.6 in 2003.
1.7.1      Tracking Groups of Activities
Table 1.16, panels A and B, present the average proportion of women’s and 
men’s awake time spent in the harmonized activities, respectively. A moti-
vation of the cluster analysis was to classify these activities into aﬀectively 
similar categories so that changes in time use could be tracked in a more 
manageable set of categories.
Speciﬁ  cally, for each person we ﬁ  rst computed the average percentage 
of the awake day spent in each of the six clusters previously described. We 
next averaged over every individual in the sample.34 Table 1.17, panel A, 
summarizes the results for men and women combined. The picture that 
emerges is one of stability for clusters 1 (unpleasant personal maintenance), 
2 (moderately enjoyable tasks), and 6 (work-  like activities). Time spent on 
cluster 4 (neutral downtime) is up while cluster 3 (engaging leisure) and 
cluster 5 (mundane chores) are down. Overall, these ﬁ  gures suggest that 
aﬀectively neutral downtime activities like watching television have gained 
at the expense of mundane chores and engaging leisure activities over the 
last forty years.
Panels B and C of table 1.17 report separate results for men and women, 
respectively. For men, the share of the day devoted to cluster 6 (work-  like 
activities) has declined by 6 percentage points since 1965 and 1966, while the 
share devoted to cluster 4 (neutral downtime) has increased by 8.5 points. 
Women, not surprisingly, have increased time in cluster 6 activities by 5 per-
centage points because of higher labor force participation, while time spent 
on mundane chores fell even more, by almost 7 points. The amount of time 
women spend in cluster 3 (engaging leisure) fell by roughly the same amount 
(3 points) as their time devoted to cluster 4 (neutral downtime) increased. 
These shifts, on balance, do not suggest signiﬁ  cant improvements in aﬀective 
experience for women over this entire forty-  year time span.
33. Sleep rose from 7.95 hours in 1965 and 1966 to 8.5 hours in 2005, or by 2.3 percentage 
points on a twenty-  four hour day.
34. Because a small number of activities (accounting for less than 3 percent of awake time 
each year) were not assigned to clusters in the PATS, they are omitted here. The percentages 
were renormalized to sum to 100 percent accordingly.Table 1.16  Percentage of days spent in each activity, 1965–1966 to 2005

















  1 General or other personal care 1.52 0.20 0.79 0.32 0.25 0.09
  2 Wash, dress, personal care 5.80 4.90 6.67 5.84 5.22 4.96
  3 Personal medical care 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.44 0.64
  4 Meals at work 0.74 0.69 0.72 0.00 0.05 0.03
  5 Other meals and snacks 7.09 7.83 7.32 6.88 5.27 5.51
  6 Main paid work (not at home) 14.32 14.07 15.83 21.10 19.51 19.13
  7 Paid work at home 0.62 0.56 1.36 0.81 1.36 1.28
  8 Second job, other paid work 0.14 0.17 0.26 0.01 0.64 0.62
 9 Work  breaks 0.51 0.34 0.18 0.06 0.02 0.02
10 Other time at workplace 0.23 0.19 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00
11 Time looking for work 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.18 0.14
12 Regular schooling, education 0.19 0.30 0.33 1.01 0.61 0.43
13 Homework 0.30 0.42 0.48 0.77 0.79 0.70
14 Short course or training 0.21 0.20 0.28 0.04 0.06 0.21
15 Other education or training 0.72 0.03 0.16 0.09 0.02 0.02
16 Food preparation, cooking 7.46 7.08 5.77 4.09 3.74 3.77
17 Set table, wash/put away dishes 3.71 2.26 1.87 0.68 1.23 1.22
18 Cleaning 5.94 5.76 4.52 4.79 3.97 4.58
19 Laundry, ironing, clothing repair 4.43 2.45 1.99 1.58 2.21 2.37
20 Home repairs, maintain vehicle 0.30 0.60 0.40 0.39 0.32 0.28
21 Other domestic work 1.58 0.59 1.49 1.40 1.26 1.24
22 Purchase routine goods 1.90 2.94 3.10 0.93 3.35 3.31
23 Purchase consumer durables 0.14 0.12 0.08 2.60 0.01 0.02
24 Purchase personal services 0.27 0.26 0.16 0.18 0.26 0.19
25 Purchase medical services 0.13 0.25 0.30 0.37 0.43 0.33
26 Purchase repair, laundry services 0.33 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.11
27 Financial/government services 0.06 0.14 0.20 0.12 0.09 0.10
28 Purchase other services 1.52 0.10 0.19 0.10 0.06 0.06
29 General care of older children 3.47 2.36 2.23 1.44 2.60 2.37
30 Medical care of children 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.16 0.17
31 Play with children 0.32 0.30 0.41 0.33 0.87 0.81
32 Supervise/help with homework 0.25 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.52 0.45
33 Read to/with, talk with children 0.24 0.36 0.18 0.06 0.38 0.43
34 Other child care 0.30 0.57 0.23 0.43 0.54 0.53
35 Adult care 0.67 1.10 0.51 0.51 1.65 1.35
36 General voluntary acts 0.45 0.29 0.43 0.05 0.91 0.78
37 Political and civic activity 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00
38 Worship and religious acts 0.95 1.09 0.84 1.02 0.98 0.89
39 General  out- of- home  leisure 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.00 0.19 0.21
40 Attend sporting event 0.11 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.22 0.16
41 Theater, concert, opera 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.14 0.11 0.08
42 Museums, exhibitions 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.05
43 Café, bar 0.11 0.27 0.49 0.30 1.63 1.44
44 Parties or receptions 1.54 0.55 0.55 0.69 0.68 0.61
45 Sports and exercise 0.34 0.60 0.98 1.50 0.90 0.84
(continued)Table 1.16  (continued)
















46 Walking 0.10 0.13 0.25 0.00 0.31 0.26
47 Cycling 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02
48 Physical activity/sports with child 0.05 0.13 0.15 0.10 0.02 0.04
49 Hunting, ﬁ  shing, boating, hiking 0.08 0.21 0.25 0.00 0.08 0.10
50 Gardening 0.27 0.55 0.36 0.26 0.82 0.80
51 Pet care, walk dogs 0.13 0.37 0.57 0.44 0.60 0.65
52 Receive or visit friends 4.97 4.78 2.94 4.01 4.62 1.81
53 Other in-  home social, games 0.46 0.69 0.71 0.56 0.58 0.80
54 Artistic activity 0.07 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.02
55 Crafts 1.24 1.44 0.76 0.55 0.11 0.17
56 Hobbies 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
57 Relax, think, do nothing 0.59 1.16 0.74 1.81 1.77 1.69
58 Read books 3.02 2.97 2.68 2.44 1.96 2.15
59 Listen to music (cd, etc.) 0.08 0.20 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.07
60 Listen to radio 0.28 0.19 0.23 0.11 0.07 0.11
61 Watch television, video 8.47 12.74 13.02 14.87 13.60 14.68
62 Writing by hand 0.74 0.23 0.39 0.72 0.19 0.15
63 Conversation, phone, texting 1.60 2.20 3.37 1.42 0.92 3.45
64 Use computer 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.26 0.89 1.00
65 Imputed travel 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.03
66 Travel related to personal care 0.71 0.96 0.86 1.76 1.56 0.97
67 Travel related to work 1.35 1.37 1.97 2.26 1.68 1.66
68 Travel related to education 0.11 0.13 0.22 0.23 0.13 0.11
69 Travel related to consumption 2.13 2.06 2.33 2.22 2.50 1.26
70 Travel related to child care 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.36 0.77 0.72
71 Travel related to volunteering/worship 0.39 0.91 0.67 0.37 0.27 0.26
72 Travel related to leisure 1.89 1.87 2.04 2.00 1.71 1.56
73 Missing/unclassiﬁ  ed 1.34 2.79 2.18 1.66 0.47 2.92
B. Men
  1 General or other personal care 0.93 0.19 0.74 0.34 0.25 0.17
  2 Wash, dress, personal care 4.60 4.04 4.93 4.10 3.67 3.51
  3 Personal medical care 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.31 0.60
  4 Meals at work 1.55 1.18 0.90 0.00 0.05 0.06
  5 Other meals and snacks 7.49 8.42 7.63 7.13 5.55 5.93
  6 Main paid work (not at home) 34.98 30.28 25.57 29.27 28.44 27.41
  7 Paid work at home 0.97 1.76 2.62 1.23 1.54 1.89
  8 Second job, other paid work 0.96 0.71 0.54 0.06 1.00 0.96
 9 Work  breaks 1.16 0.60 0.27 0.08 0.03 0.03
10 Other time at workplace 0.68 0.40 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00
11 Time looking for work 0.00 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.30 0.15
12 Regular schooling, education 0.32 0.67 0.64 1.23 0.64 0.50
13 Homework 0.73 0.76 0.93 0.93 0.68 0.90
14 Short course or training 0.26 0.25 0.20 0.03 0.03 0.09
15 Other education or training 0.29 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.00
16 Food preparation, cooking 0.84 1.03 1.44 1.52 1.42 1.42
17 Set table, wash/put away dishes 0.35 0.22 0.38 0.14 0.33 0.30
18 Cleaning 0.94 1.79 2.13 2.54 1.88 1.89Table 1.16  (continued)
















19 Laundry, ironing, clothing repair 0.11 0.10 0.26 0.30 0.42 0.45
20 Home repairs, maintain vehicle 0.99 1.75 1.80 1.64 1.49 1.47
21 Other domestic work 0.79 0.72 1.35 1.13 0.88 0.84
22 Purchase routine goods 1.05 1.31 1.69 0.44 2.17 1.95
23 Purchase consumer durables 0.18 0.15 0.10 1.24 0.03 0.01
24 Purchase personal services 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06
25 Purchase medical services 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.28
26 Purchase repair, laundry services 0.25 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.11
27 Financial/government services 0.04 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.07
28 Purchase other services 1.02 0.11 0.23 0.10 0.05 0.04
29 General care of older children 0.40 0.48 0.38 0.25 0.83 0.84
30 Medical care of children 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01
31 Play with children 0.46 0.17 0.23 0.20 0.60 0.54
32 Supervise/help with homework 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.23 0.17
33 Read to/with, talk with children 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.12
34 Other child care 0.11 0.13 0.06 0.15 0.25 0.25
35 Adult care 0.47 0.91 0.54 0.40 1.22 1.13
36 General voluntary acts 0.21 0.24 0.26 0.10 0.72 0.67
37 Political and civic activity 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05
38 Worship and religious acts 0.59 0.76 0.54 0.65 0.74 0.57
39 General  out- of- home  leisure 0.03 0.08 0.19 0.00 0.22 0.17
40 Attend sporting event 0.14 0.30 0.28 0.40 0.26 0.29
41 Theater, concert, opera 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.16
42 Museums, exhibitions 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.01
43 Café, bar 0.66 0.48 0.83 0.78 1.67 1.65
44 Parties or receptions 1.40 0.59 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.52
45 Sports and exercise 0.72 1.24 1.75 2.21 1.39 1.36
46 Walking 0.16 0.19 0.26 0.00 0.23 0.22
47 Cycling 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.07
48 Physical activity/sports with child 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.07
49 Hunting, ﬁ  shing, boating, hiking 0.52 0.63 0.99 0.00 0.53 0.50
50 Gardening 0.16 0.38 0.61 0.33 1.39 1.64
51 Pet care, walk dogs 0.06 0.34 0.52 0.40 0.45 0.47
52 Receive or visit friends 3.29 3.36 2.50 3.60 3.86 1.63
53 Other in-  home social, games 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.51 1.00 1.06
54 Artistic activity 0.11 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.00
55 Crafts 0.01 0.22 0.03 0.04 0.18 0.13
56 Hobbies 0.28 0.32 0.30 0.04 0.04 0.06
57 Relax, think, do nothing 0.31 1.21 0.77 1.74 1.75 1.93
58 Read books 3.46 2.61 2.42 2.44 1.55 1.44
59 Listen to music (cd, etc.) 0.10 0.42 0.13 0.08 0.26 0.32
60 Listen to radio 0.44 0.28 0.33 0.24 0.12 0.13
61 Watch television, video 11.21 12.77 14.55 16.41 16.08 17.25
62 Writing by hand 0.27 0.12 0.23 0.60 0.12 0.11
63 Conversation, phone, texting 0.99 1.53 2.05 0.73 0.44 2.69
64 Use computer 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.58 1.24 1.25
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1.7.2     Activity- Based  U- Index
In addition to classifying and tracking time use in categories, it is use-
ful to summarize time allocation in a single welfare measure. The U-  index 
can be used for this purpose. As before, the U-  index measures the percent 
of moments spent in an unpleasant state during each activity, where an 
Table 1.16  (continued)
















65 Imputed travel 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.24 0.03
67 Travel related to work 3.68 3.19 3.45 3.35 2.86 2.69
68 Travel related to education 0.19 0.27 0.17 0.22 0.15 0.09
69 Travel related to consumption 1.63 1.41 1.86 1.59 2.12 0.95
70 Travel related to child care 0.28 0.21 0.23 0.11 0.32 0.26
71 Travel related to volunteering/worship 0.37 0.81 0.62 0.35 0.24 0.18
72 Travel related to other purposes 2.06 1.97 2.58 2.35   1.79 1.71
73 Missing/unclassiﬁ  ed   1.60   2.67   2.00   2.23   0.47   2.47
Note: Based on PATS data.















1 4.2 3.6 3.9 5.8 4.4 3.8
2 10.7 12.1 11.8 9.5 11.1 11.5
3 19.8 19.6 19.0 16.5 18.3 17.1
4 16.3 20.3 20.1 21.2 20.6 22.3
5 17.6 15.2 16.3 14.6 14.0 14.1
6 31.4 29.2 28.9 32.4 31.6 31.2
Panel B: Men
1 4.5 4.0 4.2 5.0 3.9 3.6
2 10.7 11.5 11.2 9.4 10.8 11.1
3 18.2 17.5 17.8 15.5 17.4 16.1
4 14.5 17.3 18.8 20.7 20.9 23.0
5 9.7 10.2 12.6 11.4 10.4 10.2
6 42.4 39.5 35.4 38.0 36.5 36.0
Panel C: Women
1 4.0 3.2 3.6 6.5 4.9 3.9
2 10.7 12.5 12.3 9.6 11.3 11.9
3 21.2 21.5 20.2 17.3 19.2 18.1
4 17.9 23.0 21.3 21.6 20.2 21.7
5 24.7 19.6 19.6 17.2 17.5 17.9
6   21.5   20.1   23.0  27.8   26.9  26.5National Time Accounting: The Currency of Life    6 5
unpleasant state is deﬁ  ned as one where a negative emotion (sad, stress, or 
pain) strictly dominates the positive emotions (happy in this case).
Speciﬁ  cally, we ﬁ  rst computed the U-  index for each harmonized activ-
ity using the 2006 PATS data for a pooled sample of men and women. For 
example, the U-  index during paid work was 27 percent, during exercise it 
was 8 percent, and during television viewing it was 18 percent. We next com-
puted the weighted average U-  index where the weights were the percent of 
awake time the average person spent in each activity. Formally, the weighted 
average U-  index, denoted U









where wit is the sample weight for individual i, pijt is the proportion of time 
individual i spent in activity j in year t, and U j is the U-  index for activity j 
from the PATS.
Panel A of table 1.18 reports the results. The activity-  based U-  Index 
shows very little trend over the last forty years for men and women com-
bined or for women as a group. For men, however, there has been a shift 
away from activities associated with unpleasant feelings. To put the estimates 
in context, note that the diﬀerence between the activity-  based U-  index on 
weekends and weekdays is about 3 percentage points.35 Thus, the 1 point 
drop in the U-  index from 1965 and 1966 to 2005 is about one-  third of the 
diﬀerence in unpleasant feelings associated with activities during the week 
and those on the weekend.
Although the U-  index is highly correlated across activities for men and 
women, there are some notable diﬀerences in a small number of activities. 
Women, for example, ﬁ  nd supervising/  helping with homework and volun-
tary acts less unpleasant than do men. Thus, we computed the U- index sepa-
rately for men and women. We then assigned the gender- speciﬁ  c U- index for 
each activity to each observation in the historical sample, and computed the 
activity-  level U-  index separately for men and women. Panel B of table 1.18 
and ﬁ  gure 1.9 display the results, combining 2003 and 2005 for presentation. 
The results are generally consistent with those in panel A, though they are 
noisier. The gender-  speciﬁ  c weighted U-  index displays no trend for women 
and has trended downward for men over the last forty years, indicating an 
improvement in daily experience.
Table 1.19 presents regressions to control for possible changes in the age 
and education composition of the samples, as well as the survey day and 
month. The unit of observation for the regressions is an individual. The 
dependent variable is the duration-  weighted U-  index for each person’s 
activities on the survey day, or j pijt U j, where U j is the U-  index for activity 
35. With episode-  level data, the weekend-  weekday diﬀerence is about twice as large.66        A. B. Krueger, D. Kahneman, D. Schkade, N. Schwarz, and A. A. Stone
j for men and women combined. The regression-  adjusted estimates reveal 
a similar pattern: very little shift toward or away from unpleasant activities, 
on net, for women, but about a 1 percentage point shift away from activities 
associated with unpleasant feelings for men since the mid-  1960s.
Dispersion in Activity-  Level U-  Index
The activity-  level U-  index masks some important trends across people 
and groups. The standard deviation of the activity- level U- index was calcu-
lated across people each year (see ﬁ  g. 1.10). This measure of dispersion has 
grown by about 15 percent over the forty-  year period. Thus, the spread in 
time people spend in activities according to their frequency of unpleasant 
moments is increasing over time.
Table 1.18  U-  index based on time in various activities each year













A. U-  index from men and women combined
All 20.1 19.5 19.5 20.0 19.3 19.6
Men 20.9 20.4 20.1 20.2 19.6 19.9
Women 19.4 18.7 19.0 19.8 19.2 19.4
B. Gender-  speciﬁ  c U-  indices and time allocation
Men 20.2 20.1 19.2 18.8 18.7 19.0
Women   20.8   19.4   20.0   21.0   20.1   20.4
Note: A small number of missing and unclassiﬁ  ed activities were assigned the mean U-  index 
each year.
Fig. 1.9    Activity-  level U-  index over time, using gender-  speciﬁ  c U-  indexesTable 1.19  Regression models for activity-  based U-  index
All Men Women
    Coeﬃcient  
Standard 
error   Coeﬃcient  
Standard 
error   Coeﬃcient  
Standard 
error
Intercept 20.905 0.224 21.108 0.356 19.862 0.279
Year  1975–1976 –0.518 0.074 –0.338 0.118 –0.689 0.094
Year  1985 –0.544 0.070 –0.731 0.111 –0.363 0.088
Year  1992–1994 –0.031 0.071 –0.677 0.113 0.551 0.089
Year  2003 –0.682 0.070 –1.255 0.110 –0.130 0.090
Year  2005 –0.409 0.070 –0.950 0.109 0.110 0.089
Tuesday –0.137 0.071 –0.122 0.113 –0.149 0.090
Wednesday 0.007 0.071 0.035 0.113 –0.023 0.090
Thursday –0.194 0.071 –0.049 0.112 –0.325 0.090
Friday –0.513 0.071 –0.553 0.112 –0.474 0.090
Saturday –2.231 0.071 –2.599 0.113 –1.893 0.090
Sunday –3.018 0.072 –3.431 0.113 –2.645 0.090
February 0.022 0.089 –0.128 0.140 0.158 0.113
March 0.203 0.092 –0.072 0.146 0.451 0.115
April 0.056 0.095 –0.179 0.149 0.243 0.121
May –0.118 0.093 –0.272 0.146 0.004 0.117
June –0.146 0.089 –0.302 0.142 –0.018 0.112
July –0.406 0.111 –0.351 0.177 –0.470 0.139
August –0.405 0.107 –0.473 0.171 –0.363 0.134
September –0.018 0.096 –0.221 0.152 0.177 0.121
October 0.088 0.095 0.028 0.150 0.109 0.120
November 0.142 0.087 –0.031 0.140 0.313 0.109
December 0.102 0.089 0.082 0.140 0.092 0.113
Age 0.036 0.011 0.054 0.017 0.018 0.013
Age- Squared –0.001 0.000 –0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Female –0.921 0.038 — —
 HS –0.048 0.059 –0.025 0.093 –0.113 0.074
Some college 0.438 0.052 0.511 0.084 0.329 0.066
College 0.152 0.056 0.103 0.087 0.142 0.072
 College 0.009 0.075 –0.006 0.112 –0.054 0.099
R2 0.104 0.115 0.084
Sample Size   40,388       17,921       22,467    
Notes: Dependent variable is the duration-  weighted average U-  index. Regressions are estimated by 
weighted least squares. Person weights have been normalized to sum to one in each sample. Weighted 
mean (and standard deviation) of the dependent variable is 19.7 percent (4.0) for all, 20.1 percent (4.3) 
for men and 19.3 percent (3.8) for women. All explanatory variables are dummy variables except age and 
age-  squared. Base year is 1965–1966. Dashed cells indicate there is no coeﬃcient, since the gender vari-
able is a constant for women and men.68        A. B. Krueger, D. Kahneman, D. Schkade, N. Schwarz, and A. A. Stone
Additionally, the U- index has declined by more for men with a high school 
degree or less schooling than it has for men with a college degree or higher 
(see ﬁ  g. 1.11). This result is consistent with Aguiar and Hurst’s (2007) ﬁ  nding 
that leisure time increased more for the less educated than highly educated, 
partially oﬀsetting the rise in income associated with additional schooling.
1.7.3     Episode- Level  U- Index
Table 1.7 provides what we refer to as episode-  level estimates of the 
U- index for various groups. These are tabulations of the proportion of time 
spent in an unpleasant state where the episode is the unit of observation. The 
calculations do not require information on activities. If the nature of activi-
ties changes over time, the episode-  level U-  index will reﬂ  ect this change. 
The episode-  level U-  index will also reﬂ  ect the presence of others during 
the episode and other features of the episode. Moreover, if the U-  index is 
calculated at the episode level, it allows for the fact that some people may 
respond emotionally to the same activity in diﬀerent ways. Because activity 
and other measured features of episodes account for a small proportion 
of variability in aﬀect—for example, controlling for seventy-  one activity 
dummies only accounts for 6 percent of the variability in reported happiness 
across episodes—tracking changes over time in the episode-  level U-  index 
can be more informative than tracking how changes in activities are likely 
to aﬀect well-  being.
Unfortunately, an episode-  level U-  index—either for a representative 
national sample or for selected groups—can only be calculated for 2006 
because the PATS data set is cross-  sectional. Nevertheless, the PATS data 
Fig. 1.10    Dispersion of activity-  level U-  index across people, 1965–  1966 to 
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provide proof of the applicability of the idea and a baseline against which 
future measurements can be compared. If the aﬀect questions are added to 
subsequent time- use surveys, such as ATUS, then the episode- level U- index 
can be computed at regular intervals in the future.
1.8    International  Comparison
In addition to comparing subjective well- being over time, social scientists 
and policymakers have long been interested in comparing SWB across coun-
tries.36 This interest partly stems from a desire to rank countries based on 
SWB. Additionally, cross- country data have been used to study the eﬀect of 
various public policies, economic conditions, and institutions (e.g., Blanch-
ﬂ  ower 2007; Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2002; Frey and Stutzer 2002). 
The most common measures of SWB in these studies are reports of overall 
life satisfaction or happiness, which reﬂ  ect global evaluations of one’s life 
relative to some standard. In this section, we compare SWB in two “repre-
sentative” cities, one in France and the other in the United States, and ask 
whether the standard measure of life satisfaction and the DRM yield the 
same conclusion concerning relative well-  being. Speciﬁ  cally, we designed a 
survey to compare overall life satisfaction, time use, and recalled aﬀective 
experience during episodes of the day for random samples of women in 
Rennes, France and Columbus, Ohio. These cities were selected because they 
represent “middle America” and “middle France.” We also present results 
using time allocation derived from national samples in the United States 
Fig. 1.11    U-  index for men, by education, 1965–  1966 to 2003–  2005
36. This section is based on work that we did together with Claude Fischler. For a more 
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and France to extend our analysis beyond these two cities. This comparison 
illustrates national time accounting in a cross-  national context.
To preview the main results, based on the standard life satisfaction ques-
tion, we ﬁ  nd that Americans report higher levels of life satisfaction. Yet 
based on the DRM we ﬁ  nd that the French spend their days in a more posi-
tive mood, on average. Moreover, the national time-  use data indicate that 
the French spend relatively more of their time engaged in activities that tend 
to yield more pleasure than do Americans. Our results suggest that consider-
able caution is required in comparing standard life satisfaction data across 
populations with diﬀerent cultures. In particular, the Americans seem to be 
more emphatic when reporting their well-  being. The U-  index apparently 
overcomes this inclination.
1.8.1    Study  Design
The sample consists of 810 women in Columbus, Ohio and 820 women 
in Rennes, France. They were invited to participate based on random-  digit 
dialing in the spring of 2005. Respondents were paid approximately $75 
for their participation in both countries. The age range spanned eighteen 
to sixty-  eight, and all participants spoke the country’s dominant language 
at home. The Columbus sample was older (median age of forty-  four versus 
thirty-  nine), more likely to be employed (75 percent versus 67 percent) and 
better educated (average of 15.2 years of schooling years versus 14.0) than 
the Rennes sample. In addition, the Rennes sample was more likely to be 
currently enrolled in school (16 percent versus 10 percent). The diﬀerences 
in demographic characteristics partly reﬂ  ect diﬀerent circumstances in the 
countries (e.g., the employment rate is 8 percentage points higher in the 
United States than in France, and average education is 0.9 years higher in 
the United States), and partly reﬂ  ect idiosyncrasies of our two cities and 
sample. Because we compare SWB measured with diﬀerent methods for 
the same samples, our results should reﬂ  ect diﬀerences in the methods, not 
demographic diﬀerences between the samples.
Essentially the same protocols as those used in the Texas DRM were 
followed. Groups of participants were invited for a weekday evening to a 
central location, where they completed a series of questionnaires contained 
in separate packets. The ﬁ  rst packet included general satisfaction and demo-
graphic questions. The wording of the life satisfaction question closely fol-
lowed the World Values Survey (although we use a diﬀerent response set). 
The second packet asked respondents to construct a diary of the previous 
day as a series of episodes, noting the content and the beginning and end-
ing time of each.37 The average number of episodes described was 13.2 in 
Columbus and 14.5 in Rennes.
37. About 300 participants in each country were recruited for Mondays to describe a weekend 
day. Half of them were instructed to describe the preceding Saturday and half the preceding 
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In the third packet, respondents completed a form for each of the epi-
sodes they had previously listed. The form included a list of twenty-  two 
activities and eight interaction partners, with an instruction to mark all that 
apply. Respondents who had checked multiple activities were requested to 
indicate the one that “seemed the most important to you at the time” (we 
call it focal). Unless speciﬁ  cally noted, all analyses refer to focal activities. 
The form also requested ratings of ten emotions that were experienced at 
the time on a scale from zero (not at all) to six (very strongly). We focus on 
the following emotions: “happy,” “tense/  stressed,” “depressed/  blue,” and 
“irritated/ angry.” The questionnaire was translated back and forth between 
French and English to ensure common meanings, and some questions were 
modiﬁ  ed and deleted as a result of this procedure.
The data were reweighted by day of week to be representative of a ran-
dom day. Weekdays received 5/  7th of the weight and Saturday and Sunday 
received 1/  7th of the weight in the weighted samples. Additional details of 
the procedures and all questionnaires are available online.38
1.8.2    Life  Satisfaction
Table 1.20 contains tabulations of reported life satisfaction in the two 
cities. As in most populations, reports of being very unsatisﬁ  ed are rare. The 
American women, however, are twice as likely to say they are very satisﬁ  ed 
with their lives as are the French women (26 percent versus 13 percent). Fur-
thermore, assigning a number from one to four indicating life satisfaction, 
a common practice, also indicates that the Americans are more satisﬁ  ed, on 
average, and the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁ  cant at the .05 level.
On further inspection, however, table 1.20 provides less clear cut evidence 
that the Americans’ responses exhibit higher life satisfaction. American 
respondents are overrepresented in both extremes, in both the very satisﬁ  ed 
and the unsatisﬁ  ed categories. If the top two categories on the satisfaction 
scale (very satisﬁ  ed and satisﬁ  ed) are combined, the French actually indi-
cate higher life satisfaction: 83 percent versus 77 percent. Thus, it is unclear 
from these data whether the French are less satisﬁ  ed or less prone to use the 
extreme ends of the scales. The propensity to express oneself in extremes can 
be inﬂ  uenced by cultural and social expectations. Cultural and social norms 
may discourage French women from reporting themselves as very satisﬁ  ed 
compared with Americans.
1.8.3      Comparing SWB with the U-  Index
The U- index is less susceptible to a tendency for the Americans to be more 
emphatic than the French as long as both apply their interpretation of the 
scales consistently to positive and negative emotions. To take an extreme 
example, suppose the French only use the zero to ﬁ  ve portion of the zero to 
six scale, while the Americans utilize the full scale. Provided that the French 
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use the zero to ﬁ  ve range consistently for reporting positive and negative 
emotions—that is, an emotion reported as a ﬁ  ve is always experienced more 
intensively than an emotion reported as a four—then, apart from integer 
concerns, the U- index is unaﬀected by this diﬀerential use of scales. As com-
monly applied, however, the standard life satisfaction measure is not robust 
to such reporting diﬀerences across people because the French would appear 
as less satisﬁ  ed if they express themselves less emphatically.
The ﬁ  rst row of table 1.21 reports the average episode-  level U-  index 
for the two samples. In this case, the U-  index for an episode is deﬁ  ned as 
equal to one if the maximum rating of “tense/  stressed,” “depressed/  blue,” 
or “irritated/  angry” strictly exceed the rating of “happy,” and zero if not. 
The U-  index was weighted by the proportion of each person’s waking day 
spent in an episode to derive an overall estimate. In contrast to reported 
life satisfaction, the U-  index is 2.8 percentage points lower in the French 
sample (16 percent) than in the American sample (18.8 percent). Thus, the 
French appear to spend less of their time engaged in unpleasant activities 
(i.e., activities in which the dominant feeling is a negative one) than do the 
Americans in our samples.
We explored whether the lower U-  index for the French is a result of any 
single negative emotion, or combinations of them. The lower U-  index for 
the French appears to be a fairly robust result. If we required that at least 
two negative feelings were rated more strongly than happy, for example, the 
U-  index was still 2.8 points lower in France than in the United States (10.1 
percent versus 7.4 percent) And if we dropped any one of the negative emo-
tions and compared the remaining two to happy, the U-  index was lower in 
France than in the United States in each case. These results suggest that the 
lower U-  index in France is not due to the rating of any particular negative 
emotion in our study.
The other rows of table 1.21 provide comparisons of the episode-  level 
U-  index for various subpopulations. The general pattern is sensible. For 
example, the U-  index in both countries is considerably lower on weekends 
Table 1.20  Distribution of reported life satisfaction in Columbus, OH and 
Rennes, France
      U.S. (%)  
France 
(%)  
Not at all satisﬁ  ed 1.6 1.1
Not very satisﬁ  ed 21.4 16.1
Satisﬁ  ed 51.0 70.0
  Very satisﬁ  ed   26.1   12.9  
Notes: Life satisfaction is based on the question, “Taking all things together, how satisﬁ  ed are 
you with your life as a whole these days?” Sample size is 810 women for Columbus and 816 
women for Rennes. Chi-  square test of identical distributions rejects at p  0.001.National Time Accounting: The Currency of Life    7 3
than on weekdays. The French-  American gap is largest for nonstudents, 
employed people, low-  income people, and during the week. Interestingly, 
in both countries—but especially in the United States—the U-  index of the 
unemployed is much higher during the week than it is during weekends. This 
pattern suggests that observing others go to work during the week worsens 
the mood of the unemployed during weekdays.
There is greater inequality in the U-  index across people in the American 
sample than in the French sample. Figure 1.12 displays the average U- index 
by quintile of the individual- level U- index distribution in each country. The 
average woman in Columbus in the top quintile of the distribution spent 57.5 
percent of her time in an unpleasant state, while her counterpart in Rennes 
spent 49.0 percent of her time in an unpleasant state. Regression analysis 
indicated that the gap in the upper tail is only partially accounted for by in-
dependent variables such as the log of household income, a quadratic in age, 
school enrollment, and day of week. Controlling for these variables reduced 
the U.S.-  French gap in the upper quintile from 8.5 points to 5.3 points.
Another issue concerns vacations. In our sample, the French report taking 
twenty-  one more vacation days than the Americans. We were not able to 
interview people if they were away from home, so we did not sample most 
vacation days. Accounting for vacations would almost certainly lower the 
U-  index in France relative to the United States, as vacation days are likely 
to have a lower U-  index than nonvacation days. The following back of the 
Table 1.21  U-  index for various groups in Columbus, OH and Rennes, France 
DRM surveys
Group   U.S.   France   Diﬀerence
All 0.188 0.160 0.028∗∗
Enrollment status
 Nonstudent 0.181 0.144 0.037∗∗
 Student 0.243 0.229 0.014
Employment status
 Employed 0.189 0.143 0.046∗∗∗
 Unemployed 0.219 0.190 0.029
Household income
 Bottom  half 0.203 0.173 0.030∗
 Top  half 0.169 0.143 0.026
Day of week
 Weekday 0.205 0.174 0.031∗
 Weekend   0.144  0.122   0.022
Notes: U-  index is computed as proportion of time in which the rating of the maximum of 
tense, blue, and angry is strictly greater than the rating of happy. P- values are for test of coun-
try diﬀerences for each group.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.74        A. B. Krueger, D. Kahneman, D. Schkade, N. Schwarz, and A. A. Stone
envelope calculation suggests, however, that this is not a large bias. The 
twenty-  one day diﬀerence in vacations amounts to only 5.8 percent of the 
year. If the U-  index is 10 points lower on vacation days than nonvacation 
days, which is almost double the diﬀerence on weekdays and weekends, then 
the French U-  index would be an additional 0.58 percentage points lower 
than the American U-  index.
1.8.4    Counterfactual  Cross-  Country  Comparisons: 
Activity Level Analysis
Table 1.22 presents the U- index for twenty- one activities and the propor-
tion of the day the average person devoted to each activity based on the 
DRM. (These activities are diﬀerent from those in some of our other DRMs 
because of translation issues.) If more than one activity was engaged in at 
a time, we selected the activity that was indicated by respondents as being 
most important at the time. Activities such as working, commuting, and 
child care have a high U-  index, and activities such as walking, making love, 
and exercising have a low U-  index, similar to our earlier ﬁ  ndings.
Both the pattern of time allocation and the U-  index for each activity 
are similar in the two countries, with correlations of 0.93 and 0.85, respec-
tively. The most notable exceptions to this pattern are that the Americans 
ﬁ  nd child care substantially more unpleasant than do the French, and the 
French spend less time engaged in child care and more time eating. The 
latter is explained mainly by the fact that Americans are much less likely to 
indicate eating as their main activity when they engage in multiple activities 
that include eating. It is also worth noting that the French women in our 
sample are slightly less likely to have children living at home (56 percent 
versus 60 percent).
Fig. 1.12    Average U-  index by quintile of the U-  index distribution in U.S. and 
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The data in table 1.22 can be used to perform counterfactual calculations. 
Speciﬁ  cally, we can use the time allocation across activities for one country 
to weight the U-  index for the other country and thus create a “synthetic” 
U-  index. To be more precise, deﬁ  ne the synthetic U-  index using country j’s 
time allocation (H 
j
i) and country k’s U- index (U i
k) for activities denoted i as 
Uj,k  i H 
j
iU i
k. The “synthetic” U-  index indicates how the average French 
woman, say, would feel if she experienced her activities in the same way as 
the average American woman. Table 1.23 reports the synthetic U-  indexes 
for each country.39
The results indicate that if the French and American women’s allocation 
of time is weighted by either the average American woman’s rating of activi-
ties or the average French woman’s rating of activities, the average French 
woman is predicted to have a lower synthetic U-  index than the average 
American woman. But only about one-  third to 40 percent of the between-
Table 1.22  The U-  index and allocation of time across activities based on 
DRM surveys
U-  index per activity Percent of time (%)
Focal activity   U.S.  France  U.S.   France
Walking 0.04 0.09 0.63 1.69
Making love 0.05 0.03 0.77 0.98
Exercise 0.06 0.03 0.88 1.21
Playing 0.07 0.02 1.47 1.26
Reading, nonwork 0.09 0.07 2.97 4.36
Eating 0.10 0.09 5.22 11.11
Prayer 0.11 0.16 1.70 0.25
TV 0.12 0.14 7.07 7.32
Relaxing 0.13 0.13 2.88 2.85
Preparing food 0.14 0.13 2.92 3.29
Talking, nonwork 0.14 0.12 9.35 11.58
Grooming 0.15 0.14 5.19 4.76
Other 0.16 0.13 8.54 5.72
Housework 0.18 0.23 5.91 5.16
Sleep 0.18 0.15 2.70 2.32
Other travel 0.20 0.20 3.23 3.22
Shop 0.22 0.20 4.86 4.35
Computer, nonwork 0.23 0.22 2.52 2.28
Child care 0.24 0.11 6.85 4.50
Commute 0.27 0.26 2.22 1.68
Work   0.29  0.26   22.10  20.12
39. Notice that when the same country’s time allocation and activity-  level U-  indexes are 
used the synthetic U-  index is slightly diﬀerent from the episode-  level U-  indexes reported in 
the ﬁ  rst row of table 1.8. This discrepancy arises because there is a weak correlation between 
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 country diﬀerence in the U- index comes about because of diﬀerences in time 
allocation. Moreover, with small samples to compute time allocation, the 
diﬀerence in the synthetic U-  index is not statistically signiﬁ  cant regardless 
of which country’s activity ratings are used.
We can calculate the synthetic U-  indexes using larger samples of time 
allocation data from national time-  use surveys, however. This provides a 
check on whether our results for Rennes and Columbus can be extended 
to the countries as a whole, and yields more precise estimates. Speciﬁ  cally, 
we analyzed national time-  use data on American women from the 2003 to 
2004 ATUS and on French women from the 1998 to 1999 Enquête Emploi 
du Temps survey by INSEE. We restrict both samples to women age eighteen 
to sixty. Although the French data are from an earlier time period, they 
are the most recent national data publicly available, and time allocation 
does not change very rapidly over time within countries. Because the activ-
ity categories in national time-  use data are not harmonized, we collapsed 
the activities in these surveys into six broad categories: work, compulsory 
activities, active leisure, passive leisure, eating, and other. The U-  index for 
these categories was computed from the DRM for Rennes and Columbus 
for the same activities.
Results are reported in table 1.24. The national time allocations are gener-
ally similar to what we found for Rennes and Columbus. In particular, using 
national data the French women spend less time working, less time partici-
pating in passive leisure (e.g., watching TV), and more time participating in 
active leisure (e.g., exercise and reading) and eating than do the American 
women. As was found before, the French allocation of time produces a 
slightly lower synthetic U-  index regardless of whether the American or the 
French U-  index is used to rate each activity. Using either U-  index to rate 
the activities, the French allocation of time produces about a 1 percentage 
point lower synthetic U-  index. With the larger national time-  use samples, 
the diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁ  cant at the 0.10 level, although they are 
similar in magnitude to the diﬀerences reported in table 1.23.
Table 1.23  Synthetic U-  index based on country’s aggregate time allocation and 
country’s U-  index by activity
Country’s time
Country’s U-  index  U.S.   France  Diﬀerence  t- ratio
U.S. 0.189 0.177 0.012 1.02
France   0.169  0.159   0.010   0.90
Notes: Standard errors for t-  ratios are derived from a bootstrap procedure that takes into ac-
count sampling variability in the U-  index and in the time allocation. Calculations based on 
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1.9    Conclusion
National Time Accounting provides a method for tracking time alloca-
tion and assessing whether people are experiencing their daily lives in more 
or less enjoyable ways. This chapter demonstrates how NTA can be used to 
compare groups of individuals, countries and eras. Many economists argue 
that a decline in the amount of time spent working has been a major source 
of improvement in Americans’ daily lives over the last century (Fogel 1999). 
Shifts in time use among nonwork activities also aﬀect the experience of 
daily life. If nonwork time increases in the next century as much as it did in 
the last century, it will be even more important to understand the experience 
of nonwork time. Tracking the U- index over time, either at the episode level 
or at the activity level, provides a means for measuring whether daily life 
is becoming more or less pleasant, and of understanding why. To facilitate 
NTA in the future, we think that adding a module on aﬀective experience to 
ongoing time-  use surveys, such as ATUS, should be a priority.
The PATS data on evaluated time use that we developed for NTA and 
summarize here reinforce some ﬁ  ndings from the previous literature on over-
all happiness and life satisfaction and provide new results and puzzles. At 
the individual level within a country, the demographic correlates of experi-
Table 1.24  National time-  use data for U.S. and France and synthetic U-  indices






leisure (%)  
Active 





Fraction of awake time spent in each activity
U.S. 24.6 35.2 24.8 7.5 6.6 1.3
France 21.8 34.8 18.1 10.6 14.3 0.5
Average U-  index per activity
U.S. 0.29 0.19 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.15
France  0.26   0.17   0.14   0.09   0.09   0.13
Notes: Synthetic U- index based on country’s aggregate time allocation from national time- use 
data and country’s U-  index by activity from DRM.
  Country’s time
Country’s U-  index  U.S.   France  Diﬀerence  t- ratio
U.S. 0.193 0.184 0.010 1.67
France   0.173  0.164   0.009   1.74
Standard errors for t-  ratios are derived from a bootstrap procedure that takes into account 
sampling variability in the U-  index and in the time allocation. The work activity combines 
working and commuting; the compulsory activity combines shopping, housework, preparing 
food, and grooming; passive leisure combines watching TV, nonwork computer use, relaxing, 
and napping; activity leisure combines exercise, walking, making love, playing, and talking.78        A. B. Krueger, D. Kahneman, D. Schkade, N. Schwarz, and A. A. Stone
enced well-  being and life (or happiness) satisfaction mostly have the same 
sign. Life satisfaction and the U-  index, however, yield a diﬀerent ranking 
of France and the United States, most likely because of cultural diﬀerences 
in reporting that lead the French to appear less satisﬁ  ed. In addition, expe-
rienced well-  being measures provide a means for decomposing diﬀerences 
between groups that is not possible with conventional life satisfaction data. 
For example, we show how diﬀerences in subjective well-  being between age 
groups can be attributed to a component due to diﬀerences in time allo-
cation and a component due to diﬀerences in feelings for a given set of 
activities. This analysis revealed that diﬀerences in time use account for a 
majority of the diﬀerence in experienced well-  being between younger and 
older individuals. Unlike previous attempts to measure experienced well-
  being in the time-  use literature, we emphasize that subjective-  well being 
is multidimensional, and propose the U-  index as a simple means to reﬂ  ect 
the nonlinear relationship among emotions in a National Time Accounting 
framework.
Like the NIPAs, NTA is a descriptive, not prescriptive, technique. The 
method of NTA does not lead to immediate policy recommendations. For 
example, the fact that spending time socializing may be more enjoyable than 
working for pay for the average person does not necessarily lead to the rec-
ommendation that people should socialize more and work less. Paid work is 
obviously required to aﬀord a certain lifestyle. A similar limitation applies 
to the NIPAs: although national income would be increased if all workers 
trained for higher paying professions, there are psychic and monetary costs 
that must be taken into account before making such a policy recommenda-
tion. To draw policy conclusions, we would recommend using the PATS or 
related instruments to measure outcomes of policy relevant experiments, 
such as the Moving to Opportunities public housing experiment.
Existing time-  use data sets provide several opportunities for additional 
applications of NTA. One possibility is to use the harmonized international 
time- use data sets to compare how people in diﬀerent countries devote time 
to various activities and to evaluate the activities by their average emotional 
experience according to the PATS. The clusters of activities identiﬁ  ed in sec-
tion 1.6 would seem particularly appropriate for comparing time use across 
countries. Another possibility is to use existing time- use data for the United 
States to study the eﬀect of aging on the allocation of time across activities 
by following cohorts as they age. Again, the clusters of similar activities 
identiﬁ  ed in section 1.6 could facilitate the analysis.
Several extensions, unresolved issues, and research issues concerning 
NTA should also be noted. First, although we based the emotions that we 
surveyed partly on the Russell circumplex and partly on practicality, the 
precise set of emotions could be tailored for the particular application at 
hand. For example, studies related to health and aging might focus on feel-National Time Accounting: The Currency of Life    7 9
ings of aches, pain, weariness, fatigue, and disorientation. In addition, PATS 
might be adapted to measure people’s sense of purpose about their daily 
routines. People could be asked whether they considered their use of time 
during sampled episodes to be meaningful or a waste of time. If additional 
emotions are included, the robustness of the U-  index to the set of surveyed 
emotions can be further explored, although some features of experience 
(e.g., meaningfulness) would seem to represent separate subjective compo-
nents of well-  being.
Another issue concerns the context of time use. That is, the precise situa-
tions that people are engaged in during their daily activities. Available time-
  use surveys collect only coarse information on the nature of activities. The 
fact that activity dummies account for such a small share of the variabil-
ity in aﬀective experience suggests that important features of activities are 
not measured by time-  use surveys. Thus, tracking the change in activities 
over time weighted by the activity-  level U-  index (or some other activity-
  level measure of emotional experience) is susceptible to missing important 
changes in people’s aﬀective experiences because a great deal of what gener-
ates emotional experience occurs within a given set of measured activities.
A related issue is that the nature of some activities changes over time. For 
example, the experience of television viewing is likely to be quite diﬀerent 
today than forty years ago, when there were few channels, television sets 
were black and white, and Tivo was not available to skip over commercials. 
While changes in the nature of activities present a problem for all studies that 
track time use over historical time, the problems are particularly apparent 
for NTA. In some respects, the problem is akin to changes in product quality 
in the consumer price index. The prospect of tracking aﬀective experience 
at the episode- level in the future, however, provides a way to avoid problems 
caused by changes in the nature of activities because it would not depend on 
the a priori assignment of activities. In addition, a time-  series of episode-
  level data on aﬀective experience would enable research into the changing 
hedonic nature of activities.
Data on emotional experience might also be used to explain people’s 
choices. What types of preferences are consistent with observed time allo-
cation patterns if people seek to maximize some function of their ﬂ  ow of 
emotional experiences? What other considerations besides maximization of 
emotional experience is needed to rationalize observed choices about time 
allocation in a maximizing framework? Or, if maximization is considered 
too strong an assumption, can people’s time allocation be explained by a 
small set of heuristics? Of course, modeling behavior with data on subjec-
tive well-  being requires that information on a relevant set of emotional 
experiences is collected. It should also be noted that understanding people’s 
choices is not a prerequisite for NTA, just as understanding choices about 
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Nonetheless, the evaluated time-  use data provide a new opportunity to 
model people’s allocation of time.
Finally, it is unclear how to fully integrate sleep and health into NTA. 
To some extent, both factors are reﬂ  ected in our measures of aﬀect. For 
example, people who are in poor health experience more pain during their 
daily lives (Krueger and Stone 2008). And a bad night sleep is associated 
with a bad mood and greater tiredness throughout the day (Kahneman et 
al. 2004). In other words, sleep and health both aﬀect the process beneﬁ  t 
of various uses of time. But if people learn to sleep half as much without 
lowering their average emotional experience during waking moments, our 
current summary measures would not credit an improvement in well- being. 
In addition, health surely has a direct eﬀect on well-  being independent of 
any eﬀect on momentary emotional experience.
While these limitations of NTA are important, they are not insurmount-
able. We suspect that many of the current limitations of NTA are amenable 
to research, just as research helped to overcome some of the problems posed 
by changes in product quality in the NIPAs. Moreover, the choices that 
people make regarding their allocation of time, particularly labor supply, 
have long been subject to economic analysis. Research on the allocation 
and experience of nonwork time is less developed, but no less important for 
economics and policy. Evaluated time use also strikes us as a fertile area for 
research because most determinants of subjective well-  being are not well 
captured by data on market transactions, and this will be even more so in the 
future as people live longer and spend a smaller share of their lives engaged 
in market work and home production.National Time Accounting: The Currency of Life    8 1
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